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 Author’s Note 
 
This paper is a review of the debates, in academic literature and policy-circles, on gender 
issues and moments of ‘post-conflict’.  
 
Part I considers in broad terms how our analyses of women’s varied situations at the moment 
of wars’ endings do and do not feed into policy development. In particular it highlights the 
phenomenon of the ‘post-conflict backlash against women’ which is common, and is much 
analysed, but which is rarely anticipated either politically or in policy terms.  
 
In Part II, a particular aspect of the post-conflict backlash phenomenon is in focus: that of 
violences against women committed by men, which are maintained, and which sometimes 
increase or appear for the first time when wars end. This phenomenon is also often 
mentioned in passing, but rarely receives much attention. Here the paper considers 
explanations that are put forward for such violence, and explores the explanatory value of the 
concept of masculinity. 
 
The two sections of this paper are to be published by the end of 2007 as chapters in the 
following book: 
 
Donna Pankhurst (ed), Gendered Peace. Women’s Struggles for Post-War Justice 
and Reconciliation, Routledge 
 
This book arose from work commissioned by the United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development for a report, Gender Equality. Striving for Justice in an Unequal World, UNRISD 
2005, which was intended to mark the passing of a decade since the Fourth World 
Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995. The book will be accompanied by three sister 
volumes drawn from this work, also published by Routledge. The volume contains case study 
chapters from various parts of the world and reviews the evolution of international law in 
strengthening women’s rights in post-conflict settings. 
 
From May 2007 the paper will be available at http://www.unrisd.org/
 
Further details may be obtained directly from Donna Pankhurst at 
d.t.pankhurst@bradford.ac.uk
 
Donna Pankhurst (PhD University of Liverpool, 1988) is Professor of Peacebuilding and 
Development at the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK. In recent years 
she has researched in Africa on conflict, post- conflict settlements, and peacebuilding, 
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 PART I 
GENDERED WAR AND PEACE 
 
This book is concerned with what happens to women when wars officially end. Along 
with several other volumes1 it recognises that women face particular difficulties at 
such “aftermath” moments which often have very strong continuities with what 
happened during wars, and with the nature of gender relations in society prior to 
armed conflict. At the international level remarkable progress has been made; in 
establishing women’s legal rights; in the identification of sexual violence as a 
potential war crime, and even progress in some women’s abilities to access such 
legal frameworks. Nonetheless, when faced with a post-war backlash from men and 
the state, women in highly varied cultural contexts tend to face distinct difficulties as 
they seek justice for crimes committed against them during and after wars; when they 
attempt to participate in “truth and reconciliation” endeavours, and when they attempt 
to re-build their lives. This book2 explores how far we have come both through 
international frameworks and in particular countries, and examines the ways in which 
the endings of war still often bring highly gendered challenges for women which are 
themselves often violent.  
 
Gendered war deaths and survival rates 
An assessment of what happens to women when wars officially end logically begins 
with an assessment of the extent of mortality and injury as post-war legacies. Much 
has been written about women’s experiences during wars and, after well over a 
decade of feminists’ lobbying, there has been some success in a generalised 
recognition at the international level, that during wars women play key roles, carry 
heavy socio-economic burdens and themselves suffer casualties. Such a shift away 
from women being virtually invisible in conflict analyses has been facilitated by a 
common understanding that after the Cold War, war itself took on a different and 
distinct character, which intensified women’s involvement. A key feature of so-called 
“new wars” is the lack of separation between the “war front” and the “home front” 
and, whilst it is possible to argue that some wars in previous decades and centuries 
could also be characterised in this way, the point is that the increased vulnerability of 
civilians has become commonplace. There are many publications which assert that 
                                                
1 Meintjes et al. 2001; Moser and Clark 2001; Turshen and Alidou 2000; El Bushra 2000; El Bushra 
2004 
2 The following chapters are based on papers commissioned by UNRISD to contribute to Gender 
Equality. Striving for Justice in an Unequal World, UNRISD 2005: Walsh, Nowrojee, Manjoo, Luciak, 
Kandiyoti, Guhathakurta, Žarkov et al. and parts of this one. 
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 civilian casualties in war are greater than military, and that women and children have 
become major casualties in war where once they were much less so (Giles and 
Hyndman 2004b:3, 4-5). Typical of these is Cockburn (2001:21), who cites the oft-
quoted figure that 90 per cent of the casualties of today’s wars are civilians.  
 
This overarching realignment of the identity of war casualties as now being 
predominantly civilian, has sometimes led to the elision that women are victimised by 
war to a greater extent than men, because the majority of civilians are women, and 
when the populations of civilian women and children are added together, they 
outnumber male combatants. In the post-war context women survivors generally 
outnumber men and so it is also often said that women as a group bear the greater 
burdens for post-war recovery. An example of this is Turshen (2001b:58). 
Nonetheless it is the case that more men than women die directly from violence 
across the world in general, as well as directly from war (Pearce 2006; WHO 2002) 
and none of those who cite the 90 per cent civilian deaths figure, or who highlight the 
burdens of women, actually refute this directly, although there is certainly ambiguity 
in some accounts if they are not read with care. 
 
Some confusion derives from the fact that we do not usually have anything like 
accurate data for war-related deaths, as recently demonstrated in the international 
disputes about deaths in Iraq (Davies 2006). Nonetheless, some analysts have 
undertaken careful statistical analysis of gender differentials,3 and the calculations of 
Plűmper and Neumayer, 2005 show that more women than men die or suffer serious 
disease as a result of war: 
over the entire conflict period interstate wars, civil wars and internationalised 
civil wars on average affect women more adversely than men … we also find 
that ethnic wars and wars in ‘failed’ states are much more damaging to 
women than other civil wars (Plűmper and Neumayer 2005:3)4
 
Nonetheless the weak statistical base and previous assertions about women “bearing 
the brunt” of war, has already led to one major publication, by the Human Security  
Commission (HSC 2005) asserting that publications which allege that women “bear 
the brunt” of war5 are misleading, citing Amnesty International (2004) in particular. 
                                                
3 For example, Stewart et al 2001: 93;  Beaumont, 2006 
4 In addition Neumayer has also recently made the same case for the disproportionate effects on women 
of natural disasters (paper presented to Royal Geographical Association Conference, London, 2006, 
(How Natural Disasters Between 1981 and 2002 Killed On Average More Women than Men).  
5 The text in a box headed, “Men as Victims, Women as Warriors” (pp. 110-111), is in fact mostly 
devoted to challenging the common assertion repeated by Amnesty International, that “women and girls 
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 The HSC alleges that in gender-aware approaches to conflict, “the huge costs that 
political violence imposes on males have been mostly ignored” (2005:111) and that 
the disproportionate suffering of women has been exaggerated. Men certainly do 
constitute the majority of battle-related deaths, a point which has never been 
questioned and is in fact emphasised in HSC’s cited source of Plűmper and 
Neumayer (2005). Nonetheless, the evidence given by these latter authors and 
Stewart et al. (2001) for the longer term strongly contradicts the HSC assertions. The 
HSC report presents no evidence to show that this previous work is incorrect, and 
confuses data about the relative number of people who have to leave their homes. 
Some of this debate may be rooted in misunderstandings about the meaning of 
“casualty”, “victim” and “bearing the burden”, but the report’s dramatic claim seems to 
go beyond the need for us to tie our analyses more closely to empirical data. In effect 
it stakes out an ideological position that itself does not accurately reflect the empirical 
evidence it cites.6  
 
On balance then, the extent of women’s war-related mortality remains controversial. 
Not surprisingly, more detailed data on the gender balance of survivors, and heads of 
household for instance, are also very difficult to generate and are often contested. 
Against this globally confusing backdrop, there are nonetheless common differences 
faced by women as a backlash against them occurs. 
 
Post-war backlash against women 
The post-conflict environment cannot be characterized as one in which life for women 
invariably returns to “normal” – even if a return to previous patterns of gender and 
social relationships, as if no war had occurred, were desirable or even possible. The 
upheaval of war, in which societies have been transformed and livelihood systems 
disrupted, in which women have assumed certain roles for the first time or come into 
contact with new ideas, has its own impact on intra-personal relationships and social 
expectations. Furthermore, evidence from gendered analyses of post-war situations 
in the former Yugoslavia, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Asia and elsewhere 
(Rehn and Sirleaf 2002) shows that women not only face a continuation of some of 
the aggression they endured during the war, but may also face new forms of 
violence. In the design of policies for post-war reconstruction, women’s needs are 
                                                                                                                                         
bear the brunt of armed conflicts fought today both as direct targets and as unrecognised “collateral 
damage” (Amnesty, 2004, cited in HSC, 2005: 110)  
6 Moreover the report contains no reflection on why the alleged inaccuracy in the literature occurred, or 
why there is still such a dramatically different set of experiences in war for women and men. 
Unsurprisingly it also offers no acknowledgement that the 40 per cent of child soldiers who are girls 
have a very different experience to their boy comrades. 
3 
 often systematically ignored, and even deliberately marginalized. This may carry 
forward echoes of past situations and power relations, but there can also be a new 
edge of aggression against women.7 Together, the continued and new forms of 
violence, and the attacks on women’s newly-assumed rights and behaviours, 
constitute what frequently amounts to a post-war backlash against women.8 Such a 
backlash seems to be very common across quite contrasting social, economic and 
geographical contexts, as has been reflected in a number of publications (for example, 
Meintjes et al. 2001) although the specifics seem to vary. Two key elements seem to 
be common: an “anti-women” discourse with associated restrictions on the life-choices 
of women regarding social, economic and political activity (El Bushra 2004; Meintjes et 
al. 2001b:12-14); and violence against women which continues above the level of pre-
conflict violence, and sometimes at a higher level than during war itself. 
 
The backlash discourse may be expressed through state institutions, the media and/or 
in everyday public and private language. It is often about “restoring” or “returning” to 
something associated with peace in the past, even where the change actually 
undermines women’s rights to a more unequal situation than before the war – in effect 
to a balance of gender politics which is unambiguously in favour of men as a gender. It 
is also often accompanied by imagery of the culturally specific equivalent of Pierson’s 
(1989) concept of a “beautiful soul”, and strongly associates women with cultural 
notions of “tradition”, motherhood, and peace, using new and old cultural norms 
(Turshen 2001a:80).9
 
Women can be targeted for having gained economic independence from men, for 
having been employed in “male” roles, or for having adopted urban and educated 
lifestyles in predominantly rural societies. There are calls for them to be forced “back” 
into kitchens and fields, even if they were not so occupied before the war (Cockburn 
2004:40). It is sometimes unclear whether these outcries are spontaneous reactions 
from individual men, or whether they are orchestrated by the state or government.10 
In either case, at both social and individual levels there are forceful attempts to define 
                                                
7 Meintjes et al. 2001; Moser and Clark 2001; Turshen and Alidou 2000; El Bushra 2000; El Bushra 
2004; Goldstein 2001:394-5 (summarises literature on aftermath of World War I); Cockburn 2004:41 
(summarises literature on aftermath of liberation wars)  
8 Pankhurst 2003:11; Pankhurst and Pearce 1997; Meitjes et al. 2001:12; Turshen 2001a:84; De Abreu 
2001: 82, Turshen and Twagiramariya 1998:105-7; Pillay, 2001:43   
9 which Turshen refers to as “retraditionalisation” in Africa 
10 Luciak, this volume ; De Abreu 1998 ; Jacobs and Howard 1987. 
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 women’s roles and rights as secondary to those of men,11 and to restrict women’s 
behaviour.  
 
Protests by women against such behaviour are often castigated as being “Western-
influenced” (Kandiyoti this volume; El Bushra 2004). In such an intense and 
sometimes violent moment, the state can bring to bear many of the policies used in 
“normal times” to intervene in gender politics, or weight the “sex war” in favour of 
men. The state becomes instrumental in enforcing controls over women’s sexuality; 
fails to increase, or prevent a decline in, women’s personal security; imposes legal, 
or supports social, restrictions on women’s movement, access to housing, jobs and 
property (especially land), and marginalizes women’s health needs. In many cases 
such official policy outcomes are reinforced by the practices of international 
organizations which do not actively seek the opinions of women or fail to promote 
their interests where this might be deemed “culturally insensitive”. Women also 
commonly find their contributions to the war and peace efforts marginalized in both 
official and popular accounts of war, as happened in Europe immediately after the 
Second World War. There seems to be an attempt to deny that shifts in gender 
relations were required for women to take on their war-time roles, or that they will 
ever, by implication, actually be possible (Kelly 2000:62; Sideris 2001a:54). 
 
Women Excluded From Post-War Planning 
“It is really amazing”, said one Kosovar woman … “that the international community 
cared only about Kosovar women when they were being raped – and then only as 
some sort of exciting story. We see now that they really don”t give a damn about us. 
What we see here are men, men, men from Europe and America, and even Asia, 
listening to men, men, men from Kosovo. Sometimes they have to be politically 
correct so they include a woman on a committee or they add a paragraph to a report. 
But when it comes to real involvement in the planning for the future of this country, 
our men tell the foreign men to ignore our ideas. And they are happy to do so – under 
the notion of “cultural sensitivity.” Why is it politically incorrect to ignore the concerns 
of Serbs or other minorities, but “culturally sensitive” to ignore the concerns of 
women?” 
Source: Rehn and Sirleaf 2002:125. 
 
                                                
11 Sideris 2001a: 67; Kelly 2000: 62; Pankhurst and Pearce 1997 
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 Such backlash experiences were experienced with bitterness by women active in 
liberation struggles, for example in Algeria, Eritrea, Mozambique, Vietnam, and 
Zimbabwe; where some of the women concerned had even risen to senior military 
ranks (Luciak this volume; Sørenson 1998:37). Ilja Luciak’s chapter summarises 
some of the fates of women in the post-war contexts of Central America. In El 
Salvador considerable social animosity and pressure was brought to bear on women 
who had challenged gender roles during conflict and those who wanted to continue to 
do so afterwards. This led to many of them choosing to be much less politically active 
and take a less public role. Political scandals resulting from the exposure of sexual 
abuse committed by Ortega and other senior members of FSLN in Nicaragua, and 
Noriega in Guatemala, revealed the extensive social support that remained for 
condoning the sexual abuse of girl children and the social abuse of women. 
Furthermore the dramatic and horrific rise in murders of women in Guatemala is seen 
to continue with impunity. The chapter concludes with the view that much of the 
resistance to change faced by women is itself reinforced, if not caused, by a backlash 
against the struggles for greater equality between women and men. 
 
The chapter by Dubravka Žarkov, Rada Drezgić, and Tanja Djurić-Kuzmanović also 
illustrates some aspects of this backlash phenomenon. The authors look at the 
reproductive rights of women and how these changed in the dramatically shifting 
political context of the break up of Yugoslavia and its consequent wars and post-war 
aftermaths. They highlight a particular feature of the post-war backlash in the region 
as being the reduction of women’s rights to abortion, as compared with the pre-war 
situation. As these were wars in which mass rape was a key weapon of war, this 
constitutes a form of violence against women having to bear the consequences of 
giving birth to children conceived under such horrific circumstances. They also 
highlight other difficult features for women in the aftermath relating to employment 
and possibilities for political action. 
 
A second major feature of post-war backlash is that of violence targeted at women, 
and sexual assault in particular, which often continue above the level of pre-conflict 
violence, and sometimes at a higher level than during war itself. Women may also be 
arrested (Jacobs and Howard 1987) and murdered (Luciak, this volume) in this 
inflamed context of anti-women discourse. After wars officially end, women continue 
to be raped by soldiers, policemen, former combatants (both strangers and partners) 
and even peacekeepers12 – those whose responsibility it is to safeguard and protect 
                                                
12 Walsh, this volume, Kandiyoti, this volume; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002; Väyrynen, 2001 
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 them in the “at peace” environment. They may be attacked at home, on the way to 
collect water, to work in the fields, in the urban workplace and when they go to the 
police station for help. In camps for refugees and the displaced, and in areas were 
livelihood systems have collapsed, they continue to be forced to sell sex as a means 
of economic survival. In addition, it is normal for domestic abuse to increase in the 
post-war setting, both from partners returning home from the war, and from partners 
who remained at home.13 Even though men also suffer from high crime rates, as a 
group they are also the main perpetrators (Pearce 2006). Men also kill each other in 
such tense post-war moments, and sometimes do in very great numbers, but it is 
also striking that sometimes their violence against women reaches extraordinary 
peaks which exceed those against men, such as in Guatemala (see Luciak, this 
volume).   
 
In this difficult post-war situation, the differences between women often reassert 
themselves, especially in countries where women are divided by a strong ethnic or 
regional identity (Žarkov et al., this volume). New divisions can occur as a result of 
the different experiences women have endured, or their different allegiances, during 
the war; for example, whether they were on the side of “victors”, “perpetrators”, or 
“collaborators”, and whether they have given birth to children of “the enemy” after 
rape. Such issues can determine who qualifies for aid and other support (Turshen 
1998:9), as can women’s marital status, and whether or not they still live with their 
husbands, or are widowed, abandoned or divorced. Marital status is highly significant 
in situations where women do not have strong legal rights (such as in land and 
property titles or access to credit), and tensions also exist between women over 
whether or how their children survived the war. These types of difference and tension 
between women make it very difficult for them to articulate common needs and this 
difficulty adds to the silencing effect of the backlash against them. They are subject 
to violence and censure if they do not want to return to old ways of living. The 
consequent increase in divorce adds to the overall post-war context of heightened 
gender tensions (El Bushra 2004). In the face of such difficulties, many women 
prioritize the restoration of peaceful relationships with men, rather than continue to 
fight for greater rights themselves.14
 
                                                
13 Cheywa, et al. 2004; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002; Sørenson 1998; Turshen 2001a: 84 
14 Luciak, this volume; Sørensen 1998: 39; El Bushra 2003 
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 Domestic violence increases after war 
“Recent research indicates that many combatants have difficulty making the 
transition to peacetime non-violent behaviour after returning home. In the United 
States in 2002, four Special Forces soldiers at Fort Bragg in North Carolina killed 
their wives within a period of six weeks. Three of the four had recently returned from 
overseas duty in Afghanistan, although some commentators believe it is not the 
experience of conflict but the culture of violence and masculinity that permeates 
military forces that causes soldiers to be violent in civilian life. Studies in Cambodia in 
the mid-1990s indicated that many women - as many as 75 per cent in one study - 
were victims of domestic violence, often at the hands of men who have kept the small 
arms and light weapons they used during the war.”  
Source: Rehn and Sirleaf, Women, War and Peace, UNIFEM, 2002. 
 
Meghna Guhathakurta’s chapter looks at the case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts in 
Bangladesh, where a conflict between indigenous people and the state resulted in a 
Peace Accord, drawing on her own research and experience. She uses a framework 
which draws out the continuities between what happened during the conflict and the 
nature of the accord and its aftermath. The chapter gives an insight into the ways in 
which violence against women that was very much part of the conflict continued after 
the Peace Accord, and the difficulties women face in seeking justice for such violence. 
 
The explanations offered for this post-war backlash violence are varied and often 
rather conjectural, and are reviewed in the final chapter of this volume. The rest of 
this chapter reviews first the political, then the socio-economic policy contexts in 
which women attempt to improve their post-war situations. 
 
Post-war political context for women 
Some wars end in an atmosphere pervasive with the desire to build a new type of 
society, particularly where some kind of liberation struggle was fought and won 
(Sørenson 1998:41-2; Turshen 2002:891-2). Where gender issues were raised as 
part of the political agenda of the conflict (for example, in South Africa); or where the 
situation of women received a lot of attention during the conflict (for example, 
Afghanistan), there may be a greater potential for improving women’s legal rights 
beyond the pre-war situation. Where many women gained sufficient confidence to 
articulate their needs during the conflict, they may be more effective campaigners 
and activists. Where the post-war period heralds a greater openness to learning from 
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 similar circumstances in other countries, governments may see more clearly the 
efficacy of supporting women. If unprecedented amounts of international funding 
become available, as is often the case in poor countries following a conflict, there 
may be external pressure for policies that support women, and funds may be directly 
available to women’s organizations.  
 
If women are to benefit from such opportunities, it is important to identify the 
strategies to promote and the issues to be given priority. These are bound to vary. 
Post-war contexts pose confusing dilemmas about the extent to which they require 
special approaches, or merely represent normal challenges for social and economic 
development. Where considerable devastation has been wrought to production and 
communication, and where large numbers of people have fled their homes, for 
instance, the need for “exceptional” approaches to macro-policies for “recovery”, 
“rehabilitation”, and “reintegration” is commonly perceived. In the political arena, there 
may likewise be “exceptional” requirements: for example, for voter registration and the 
establishment of machinery to hold elections, and increasingly for some kind of 
exceptional judicial or “truth and reconciliation” process. 
 
Such exceptional and urgent activities may receive new streams of international 
funding and be given high priority by all parties, to be conceived and implemented 
outside any normal planning process. And in the immediate post-war stage, these 
exercises are even more difficult to implement effectively than usual since the state, so 
recently contested, is politically weak and its apparatus damaged or barely intact. 
Weakened state capacity tends to lead to outcomes that are detrimental to women’s 
interests, thus adding to the cards stacked against them. In the absence of an effective 
state, the exercises in question are largely controlled and determined from outside the 
country, as part of what has become known as the “peace industry” (Pankhurst and 
Pearce 1997). 
 
Post-war administrations face the challenge of trying to (re)-build respect for human 
rights and for rights-based behaviour in the population at large, among former fighters, 
members of the security forces, and in the justice system. Despite significant 
improvements, women are still able to access fewer political rights than men in the 
post-war context, as in most others. Nurturing a human rights culture in the post-war 
context is complicated because all too often many of the perpetrators of human rights 
abuses during the war are still at large; they may even be members of the 
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 government, the police or the armed forces. Even where perpetrators are 
prosecuted, these tend to be a relatively small number despite the necessary legal 
framework and evidence against suspects being available (Walsh this volume; 
Brownmiller 1975:31-2). Furthermore, attempts to (re)-establish the rule of law in 
post-war contexts have proved to be extremely difficult in most places, even where 
extraordinarily large sums of money are invested, as was the case in Latin America 
(Seider 2003). The most common focus in immediate post-war situations is on the 
behaviour of the state, whether in a new or a changed form, to ensure that military 
and police personnel no longer act outside the law through arbitrary arrest, detention 
and torture. This attracts plaudits from the international community, even though 
achieving real change can remain elusive for many years. All too often however the 
(re)-establishment of some degree of law and order merely means that men are not 
suffering such serious abuse at the hands of those holding power.  
 
Until relatively recently, women’s rights in the post-war context seem to have been 
breached almost with complete impunity. In contexts where transitional systems of 
justice are used as part of a process to re-build the rule of law, women’s human 
rights are not given priority. For instance, the police tend to operate with a strong 
gender bias, even where post-war reform and political change means that men are 
no longer subject to arbitrary arrest and torture (Kandiyoti, this volume). It is not 
uncommon for there to be immense post-war social pressure on women not to report 
abuse by men, particularly if the men are members of key political movements, the 
government, or where there is a shortage of men available for marriage. Where rape 
was widespread during war, and is not effectively prosecuted afterwards, it is 
extremely difficult to bring prosecutions for rape in the post-war setting, an issue that 
remains as much of a problem as when it was highlighted over a decade ago in the 
UN. Children’s rights have been taken more seriously over the last decade, with the 
plight of former child soldiers receiving a great deal more attention and increasing 
international support, but the focus still remains on boys’ war experience rather than 
girls. Many experiences of girls, such as sexual abuse by peacekeeping forces in 
Mozambique (Nordstrum 1997: 15-19), remain hidden.  
 
Martha Walsh’s chapter is an extensive review of the ways in which the definition and 
prosecution of gender-based violence in conflict have developed over the last 
decade. In spite of this serious situation, legal advances at the international level 
have been much greater than anticipated and we now have a consistent body of 
international jurisprudence that has established and re-affirmed rape as a war crime, 
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 a crime against humanity and an element of genocide. Much has also been learned 
about the actual processes required for women to access such justice frameworks in 
the post-war context, and Walsh particularly highlights the lessons learned from the 
International Criminal Court for Yugoslavia. The International Criminal Court now has 
a sophisticated framework which recognises lessons from the difficulties experienced 
by women in the past and she suggests that it is important to acknowledge this great, 
and largely unexpected success, but also to keep in mind that for many women the 
ability to access such justice requires support from their nation state and the “legal 
literacy” and knowledge of processes available to them. 
 
This chapter is followed by a detailed review of a decade of work by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda by Binaifer Nowrojee. She describes the attempts and 
failures to prosecute gender-based violence in this setting and suggests that some 
lessons were learned from this experience in the post-conflict setting of Sierra Leone. 
Nonetheless the main thrust of her review is the very poor way in which women 
survivors were treated in the justice processes, and the low priority given by the court 
to the prosecution of such crimes. She highlights the importance of 
acknowledgement and justice to the women survivors and the way in which in some 
cases their attempts to give evidence actually resulted in personal and material 
suffering on their return home. 
 
Post-war truth processes, reconciliation, and women’s stories 
The linking of “truth” and “reconciliation” has become common in post-war contexts 
over the last decade. The most common understanding of “reconciliation” is that it is 
about restoring good relationships and involves some level of forgiveness; but 
different people mean different things, some focusing on what happens to individuals, 
some on groups, and some on society as a whole (Pankhurst 1997). There is 
considerable international and national discussion about whether and how 
reconciliation might be possible (Bloomfield 2004), but there has been virtually no 
discussion about “gender reconciliation”. Women are often expected to identify 
themselves with reconciliation and peace-building interventions, in the same way as 
the idea of women’s inherent peacefulness may be co-opted or deployed to reduce 
hostilities during war-time (Pankhurst 2003). Some of these interventions could be 
interpreted as being about reconciliation between women and men. 
 
The issue of amnesty and truth-telling remains controversial; where amnesty is 
offered in return for truth-telling, the sense of being deprived of justice has the 
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 potential to provoke further violence. For this reason, when the El Salvadorian Truth 
Commission released its report, the government passed an amnesty law within a few 
days, fearing that the findings could fuel further conflict. In general, Truth 
Commissions do not have the power to prosecute, although some of them do grant 
amnesty; the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission for example, was 
empowered to grant amnesty to individual perpetrators in exchange for testimony if 
they could prove that their crimes were politically motivated. However, this can also 
create problems for anyone who would prefer a prosecution. 
 
There have been 25 Truth Commissions in different parts of the world since 1974. 
Official Truth Commissions (TCs) take many different forms, seeking sometimes to 
find out information about “the disappeared”, as in Argentina, Uganda and Sri Lanka; 
at other times to work towards “truth and justice” as in Haiti and Ecuador, or “truth 
and reconciliation” as in Chile, South Africa, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, East 
Timor and Peru. The box summarizes the most common characteristics and 




 Four main characteristics of Truth Commissions 
• They focus on the past, and often on the recent past, but are not ongoing 
bodies such as human rights commissions. 
 
• They investigate a pattern of abuse over a set period of time rather than a 
specific event. The mandate of Truth Commissions is time-bound, and 
specifies the types of abuse the Commission can look at. 
 
• Truth Commissions are usually temporary bodies, operating over an average 
period of six months to two years at the end of which they submit a report. 
Sometimes their time period can be extended if necessary. 
 
• They are officially sanctioned, authorized and empowered by the State; also 
sometimes by armed opposition groups as part of a peace negotiation; in 
theory, this allows them access to information, and should also ensure that 
their recommendations and findings are taken seriously. 
 
Source: Hayner, Priscilla B. (2001) Unspeakable truths. Confronting State Terror 
and Atrocity, Routledge, London: 14 
 
Six main purposes of Truth Commissions 
• To clarify and acknowledge truth. 
 
• To respond to the needs and interests of victims / survivors. 
 
• To contribute to justice and accountability. 
 
• To outline institutional responsibility and recommend reforms. 
 
• To promote reconciliation and reduce tensions resulting from past violence. 
 
• To meet the rights of victims / survivors and society to the truth. 
Source: Hayner, op cit: 28-31 
 
Truth Commissions can also be created by NGOs. When the government of Brazil 
refused to institute a formal enquiry into human rights abuses under Brazil’s military 
regime, the Archbishop of Sao Paulo was assisted by the World Council of Churches 
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 in his own investigation. The Catholic Church in Guatemala also established a truth 
process (REHMI 1999). 
 
The most common abuses under-reported to Truth Commissions are those suffered 
by women, as indeed are those least prosecuted. Rashida Manjoo’s chapter shows 
that in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), although 
women constituted the majority of witnesses for acts of violence committed against 
others, only a few initially spoke about acts of sexual violence committed against 
themselves. After prompting from women activists, the TRC tried to create an 
enabling environment where women could feel safe to speak out; but even then few 
could find the words or courage to speak publicly of sexual violation. Some women-
only hearings were then held, which many women regarded as successful in 
addressing the problem (Goldblat and Meintjes 1998:29).  
 
In her chapter, Alessandra Dal Secco analyses three cases of post-conflict Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions which have tried to take women’s concerns seriously; 
Peru, Sierra Leone and East Timor. In the first case, as also described by Boesten, 
the determination to identify crimes against women was rather narrowly defined and 
has left many women’s experiences unacknowledged. In the other two cases the 
commitment to take such issues seriously was there from the beginning and greater 
advances were made. Nonetheless Dal Secco identifies the risks in such approaches 
leading to definitions of women’s war experiences being limited to sexual crimes and 
specifically rape. 
 
Jelke Boesten’s chapter focuses on the post-war processes in Peru and how they 
affect women who experienced sexual violence during the conflict between Shining 
Path guerrillas and government forces. A national Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in this case did not have the power to prosecute or give immunity but 
was able, due to the diligence of particular individuals, to investigate the experiences 
of women who had survived such violence. The analysis shows once again that it is 
very difficult to get testimonies from women survivors, and that the precise definition 
of the crime dramatically affected the process of collecting evidence. Sexual violence 
against women did not even feature amongst the testimonies of some communities 
asked to talk about human rights abuses, even though it was very widespread. One 
particular aspect of the post-war context here is the social practice of women and 
their parents petitioning rapists to promise to marry their victims. Until 1997 rapists 
who married their victims were exempt from prosecution, as they still are in a number 
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 of other Latin American countries, and there is still a strong social understanding that 
this act cancels out previous acts of sexual violence, depriving such women even of 
having the violence fully recorded, let alone having the right to prosecute.  
 
The ideal of a gender-aware truth process is not only to avoid omitting the particular 
sufferings of women, but also to integrate into the conflict narrative their experiences 
as fighters, survivors of attack and torture, household managers and community 
leaders. To release such stories may require a different kind of truth process than a 
national commission. For example, in 2000 women’s groups in Japan and 
neighbouring countries came together to hold a War Crimes Tribunal to look at the 
issue of sexual slavery by the Japanese army during the war (Walsh, this volume). 
Set up by women’s groups, this Tribunal had no official status; but even though more 
than half a century had passed since they experienced being sexually abused, the 
women who came forward to testify felt keenly the need for public acknowledgement 
of what they had lived through. While reluctant to accept culpability, the Japanese 
government did eventually acknowledge the issue of sexual slavery, which had 
earlier been denied; however, the women’s demand for compensation from the State 
was denied. A few women accepted compensation from a special private fund, but 
many refused; it was important to them that the Japanese State itself make 
reparations.  
 
“Traditional” conflict resolution processes 
In Africa, people are increasingly turning to local processes as a means of coming to 
terms with what happened during conflict. This coincides with a growing fashion 
among donors for promoting so-called “traditional” methods of conflict resolution 
(ending of organized violence) and post-conflict mediation and reconciliation. 
Significant funds are being applied to these processes, with multiple objectives and 
considerable confusion about whether justice, truth processes and/or reconciliation 
are being sought. These mechanisms include rituals, and transfers of property and 
labour (individual and collective), intended to achieve a range of outcomes including 
retribution, compensation, forgiveness, and building of trust. Some of these systems 
are in regular use; others are being resurrected from the memories of elderly people 
and re-invented; yet others are actually being invented from scratch. These activities 
may co-exist in the same country – even in the same communities; but they are 
increasingly being packaged under the rubric of peace-building, not least in order to 
access funding from international donors (Pankhurst 2002, 2003). 
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 These processes tend to reflect highly gendered local political and power relations, 
and by no means belong to some value-free traditional culture. They are occurring at 
the same time as “retraditionalisation” in some African countries which is usually 
geared towards limiting women’s rights (Turshen 2001a:80). Women are normally 
marginalized in practice and their needs not given any priority. Some even have 
cultural roots in such practices as exchanging women as wives between different 
groups by way of compensation and repairing community relations, as in Afghanistan 
(Kandiyoti, this volume). In post-war contexts, the revival of “traditional” practice can 
form part of the backlash process of putting women back “in their place”. On the 
other hand, where gender awareness is incorporated, it can be used to help build a 
new society. A notable example of this is the use of Gacaca in Rwanda. The 
Rwandan government revived an old system of dispute-resolution that had largely 
fallen into disuse, to assist with hearing genocide cases. Gacaca, in its new form, has 
incorporated important roles for women. Amongst many other fundamental changes 
is the participation of women as judges; although it is too early to evaluate what 
difference this might make to the outcomes.  
 
Civil and political participation 
Where there is a perception that women “earned” new rights because of the roles 
they played during war-time, there may be a new awareness in the post-war 
environment of what women can contribute politically, and of the moral imperative to 
let this happen. The chances of such perceptions influencing political structures are 
greater where there is a conscious attempt to build a “new” society after a 
“liberation”.15 It is less likely when the post-war context is dominated by a political 
ideology that does not recognize women’s contribution or potential for public life.16 In 
Kashmir, northern India, for example, it is unlikely that women will anticipate a 
moment of liberation. There, years of syncretism and a healthy mix of Islamic, Hindu 
and Sufi traditions had ensured a liberal space for women in society. With the 
deepening of the conflict and the growing hold of fundamentalism among insurgents, 
the imposition of restrictions on women has forced them to submit to rigid patriarchal 
mores (Butalia 2001). Even in deeply conservative environments such as Kashmir or 
Somalia, however, there can also be recognition during war-time of the ways women 
exercise old forms of influence-as-power. In private, they may guide men’s decisions; 
they may perform in public as singers or poets; they may give direction as elders or 
leaders in cultural activities; or act as informal negotiators whilst visiting kin or 
                                                
15 For example Nicaragua 1980s; Southern Africa in the 1970s and 1980s; South Africa in 1990s;  
16 Walsh, this volume; Kandiyoti, this volume; Sørensen, 1998 
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 engaging in trade. From such gradual accretions of responsibility, the opportunity 
may emerge for basic legal and political rights to be developed in a post-war setting. 
 
In the post-war situation, new constitutions and laws with radical provisions can come 
speedily into being; even though they initially exist only on paper, they may well be 
more progressive than if there had been no war or upheaval. For example, after the 
war of liberation in Zimbabwe, women’s legal status was much improved. In Namibia 
women were given clear rights in the constitution, as they were in Eritrea. The 
establishment of formal legal rights for women is, however, only one step towards their 
being able to exercise them. In post-conflict settings, particularly where war has been 
prolonged, illiteracy is widespread and access to the law may be confined to a handful 
of the elite. So even if the population is aware of women’s new rights they cannot 
easily be realized.17 Moreover, the existence of such political rights does not protect 
women from the “backlash” described earlier.  
 
Even where the political and legal apparatus is in place to allow women to take part 
in political life, their level of political participation tends to remain lower than men’s. 
They may be discouraged by the educational requirements for voter registration, or 
the long distance needed to travel in order to vote, as shown in a number of 
elections. Practical or cultural constraints, or family and community pressure, can bar 
women from exercising their right to vote, or to stand for elections. Similarly, attempts 
to encourage civil society organizations to participate in public debate, or consult with 
government, may marginalize the views of women if they are dominated by men. 
Special activities to involve women may still be required, and may not be put in place 
even though they have long been proposed at international level (EC 1995).  
 
Ilija Luciak’s chapter looks at three countries in their Central American setting: El 
Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua, and focuses on the efforts that women have 
made, both within their own countries and across this region, to take forward the 
political issues of the post-war context. In these countries a good number of women 
joined guerrilla struggles because they believed that this would help to bring social 
justice, and their presence also gave prominence to women’s rights within that 
framework. Many other women were forced, or chose, to take on what he calls 
“counter-traditional roles” during wars. The expectation of social change at the point 
of a peace settlement was therefore very high.  
                                                
17 see Batezat, 1988 on Zimbabwe, Bentley 2004 on South Africa  
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 The chapter evaluates the political strategies used by women’s groups in the three 
countries. In El Salvador, the difficulties of building alliances and making tactical 
priorities around elections led to a reduction in the number of women elected after 
some initial success. In Nicaragua there was a greater success of getting women 
elected under the FSLN but this did not automatically lead to women’s issues being 
taken more seriously, which only happened after the Sandinistas lost power and the 
women’s movement developed more autonomously. The chapter then illustrates 
some of the common frustrations with having quotas for women candidates through 
what happened in Nicaragua. By the time of Guatemala’s peace accord, coming last 
in 1996, women’s groups had been successful in getting gender issues actually 
written into the accord, which had not been possible in the other two cases. That 
however was only the first step and many of them have still not been implemented. 
 
The issue of how to increase women’s representation in politics remains challenging. 
The Beijing Platform for Action called for a 30 per cent minimum representation of 
women in decision-making bodies; UN Security Council Resolution 1325 urges the 
appointment of women in peace processes and subsequent political structures. 
There have been some striking successes in using these international frameworks to 
increase the representation of women. In post-war settings in particular there are 
sometimes opportunities for pushing forward reforms and innovative approaches, 
where there is a coincidence between the desires of international donors and local 
women’s groups. 
 
Where women have gained stronger political voice through the experience of conflict, 
they may be able to leapfrog stages that elsewhere remain protracted. For instance 
in South Africa, the majority of ANC leaders at the transition to democracy were men, 
even though gender equality was much discussed. Women fought for representation 
and succeeded, with the result that the first parliament of the Government of National 
Unity was made up of 15 per cent women in the Senate and 24 per cent in the 
National Assembly (Sørenson 1998). Similarly in Eritrea, the government ensured 
that the post-war administrative system involved women; it was agreed that women 
would have a 30 per cent quota in regional and sub-regional councils and could 
contest any of the remaining 70 per cent of posts (Sørenson 1998). Even in 
Afghanistan, the Constitutional Loya Jirga ensured that at least 19 per cent of the 
500 seats went to women, who actually gained 20 per cent, as described by Deniz 
Kandiyoti in this volume. 
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 Sometimes measures to assist women’s representation have been introduced post-
war that would not be implemented in donor countries promoting this agenda (Rehn 
and Sirleaf 2002:81). For instance, the UK government supported the reservation of 
seats for women in local and national government structures in Uganda at the same 
time that the use of women’s quotas for political parties was deemed illegal in the UK 
(Tamale 1999). Many such issues are felt across the world as women try to increase 
their engagement in formal politics, but in post-war societies where the conditions are 
ripe, change can happen at an unprecedented rate. Rwanda offers a very striking 
example. Here, elections to the national assembly in 2003 delivered 49 per cent of 
the seats to women, a higher proportion than in any OECD country. This does not 
indicate a Rwandese revolution in gender relations, but rather reflects the high 
proportion of women among genocide survivors. Nonetheless this massive change 
was by no means demographically inevitable, and will have consequences for 
political life in Rwanda that are as yet to early to judge.  
 
Macro-economic and macro-social policies: implications for women  
Macro-level policies for the post-war context tend to ignore what women are trying to 
do, unless they are intended to stop them doing it. For instance, many women continue 
with war-time economic strategies involving small-scale trade in the informal economy; 
such strategies tend to be ignored as being unsustainable or unimportant, rather than 
being evaluated as providing an important service, let alone the potential for successful 
business growth. In Mozambique, to take a case in point, the post-war government set 
up restrictions on the informal “grassroots economy”, on which women had come to 
depend (Chingono 2001:116). Similarly women also often attempt to re-build primary 
education and primary health care services themselves as state services collapse; but 
these are not generally built on after war, but pushed aside in favour of bringing in 
qualified professionals, who tend to be men (Sørensen 1998). 
 
Policy initiatives at the macro level need to build gender analysis into peace-building 
policy processes, alongside “special” policies specifically geared towards women; 
this has been accepted as appropriate by key international organizations for some 
time (EC 1996; UN 1995:para 141). At its simplest, a gender-aware approach 
requires applying the question: “Does this policy affect women and men differently?” 
If the answer is in the affirmative, then policy-makers need to explore what can be 
done to prevent or correct women’s disadvantage (Elson 1998). Posing this question 
should lead in some cases to a complete re-think in the way a policy is developed 
and implemented; in others, relatively minor adjustments would be required. In post-
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 war emergency situations in poor countries, it may be difficult to apply a gender-aware 
approach. Not only are resources scarce, and infrastructure weak, but new 
governments are often constrained in their spending by the conditions of World Bank 
structural adjustment and bilateral loans, which place strict limitations on budgetary 
expenditure. A growing lobby supported by some eminent economists argues that such 
conditions ought to be loosened in post-war economies, since they severely undermine 
the chances of economic recovery. The needs of women and other vulnerable groups 
should be given a higher priority than macro-economic probity (Stewart and Fitzgerald 
2001:240). 
 
If there is political willingness to take the gender implications of policy seriously, the 
analytical tools already exist to undertake the necessary data collection, analysis, 
monitoring and evaluation. In some post-war environments, as was the case in Uganda 
after 1986, the political will to do this may be strong. Where such opportunities occur, it 
might be possible to develop some elements of a top-down gender-aware approach to 
a range of policies. It has now become usual in post-war circumstances to attempt a 
bottom-up approach of at least some support for women’s organizations as the most 
obvious way to support women. International links between women’s organizations 
have been expanded in recent years and are greatly facilitated by the IT revolution. 
 
Such a positive political environment cannot by any means be guaranteed; indeed, in 
the atmosphere of backlash already described, the political will for changing gender 
relations may be completely absent, or at best ambivalent. For various reasons, 
women themselves may not be in a position to press for positive change. Deniz 
Kandiyoti’s chapter shows how external donors have misunderstood the local 
cultures in Afghanistan, assuming that so-called traditions which oppress women are 
timeless when in fact they have a history of being contested and varying in intensity. 
In spite of a strong international commitment to improve the situation of women in the 
post-war context, women have a very difficult time in trying to fight poverty and 
protect their livelihoods while also being subject to violence from men, including 
those in official positions. 
 
Nonetheless, the contrasting political post-war contexts mean that opportunities can 
arise. Some general economic and social policies have more acute implications for 
women than others and significant change could be supported by focusing on a few 
key areas. Specific contexts determine both what is possible and what ought to be 
20 
 prioritized. For example, where the majority of the surviving population relies on 
agriculture as the main source of livelihood, land reform is often key. Where levels of 
urbanization and education are higher, employment issues are of far greater 
significance. In all contexts however, it is normal at the end of war to find women 
dominating the most marginalized sections of society. They are the returnees with 
access to the fewest resources, the ex-combatants who tend to be overlooked, the 
heads of household with least support. Women tend to predominate in the most 
stigmatized and disadvantaged groups: rape survivors, orphans, disabled people and 
widows (who may constitute up to 30 per cent of a post-war population [Sørensen 
1998:38]). They generally tend to be the least well-trained and educated, whether in 
urban or rural areas, and have specific health needs that are overlooked.  
 
Agriculture and land reform 
Agricultural economies, where the majority of the population still mainly depends on 
cultivation and raising of livestock for their food supply, are normally characterized by a 
strong gender bias in favour of men. Women typically receive less of the income 
generated from their labour, and have less access to other people’s labour and less 
control over their own, than men. Meanwhile, men are often accused of “wasting” farm 
incomes in times of social change, and particularly during conflict. As a result, many 
women seek opportunities to sell their labour to others for very poor returns, 
sometimes in secret, to guarantee some minimum resources for household needs 
(UNIFEM 2001; Sørenson 1998:20). In places where women are unable to get access 
to sufficient land to farm, as in Rwanda, Cambodia, Zimbabwe, and Sri Lanka, they 
hire themselves out as casual workers (Sørenson 1998:19). 
 
During periods of violent conflict, agriculture becomes important as a source of food, 
even for people whose livelihoods were previously non-agrarian. Where men are away 
fighting, or are injured or dead, women often take up the burden of agricultural 
production even where they did not do this previously. War also disrupts established 
systems of land tenure. Men take land by force as social regulation breaks down and 
people move away from their homes into new areas. Landmines restrict the use of 
fields and grazing land, putting great pressure on the remaining accessible areas. 
Soldiers use land for camps, often killing wildlife and stripping vegetation and soil. 
Traders and soldiers negotiate tenure deals with local leaders for mining or natural 
resource extraction, as in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and even buy and 
sell land.  
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All this may take place without reference to local custom or law relating to ownership 
and use of land, which leaves a confused post-war land rights legacy. This happened 
in Mozambique, even though existing communal land tenure arrangements made the 
sale of land illegal (UNIFEM 2001:45-53).  It is rare to find that there is agreement, let 
alone a written record, of land transactions during the war; nor a clear understanding 
as to who the rights should pass to in the event of the landholder’s death. Previously 
accepted land tenure systems break down or become superseded because of new 
land shortages, the absence or removal of local leaders, and the collapse of local 
government institutions.  
 
The more severe the land shortage, the more the pressure on women’s rights. In many 
places women may be the majority of post-war adult survivors in the countryside, and 
there may also be many women-only households, as in Mozambique, desperate for 
land to grow food (Chingono 2001:95). Nonetheless, discriminatory legal practices, or 
entrenched social attitudes can still prevent them from taking possession of family 
lands.18 In Rwanda, many men were killed during the genocide; but women were 
barred from claiming lands through inheritance under customary law, even though 
under the constitution they have the legal right to inherit. Some revisions were made 
to inheritance laws to try to address this problem, but these still do not provide 
women with secure tenure (UNIFEM 2001:38-44).  
 
Many other examples can be cited to reinforce a picture of women’s rights or access 
to land gained during conflict receding in the post-conflict period. The United Nations 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia found that many disputes arose over ownership of 
land at the village level, while the simultaneous breakdown of traditional systems of 
conflict resolution meant that women and children found themselves at the receiving 
end of heightened levels of violence (Curtis 1998). In post-war Eritrea, men protested 
against women having access to land even though the majority of households were 
probably headed by women. While in exile, Guatemalan refugees had given women a 
voice in political structures; on returning home, when women tried to claim equal rights 
to land, they were attacked by local people for having “overstepped the acceptable 
limits … prescribed for women”  (UNIFEM 2001:58-62).  
 
                                                
18 Meitjes et al 2001:16; Turshen 2001b:62-3; Cockburn 2001:26 
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 At the end of a conflict, there is often pressure to “sort out” land tenure and land use 
from several directions. Land and agrarian reform may be seen as a means of 
speeding up the process of recovery and “normalization” – part of a modernization 
agenda that takes on a keener urgency in the post-war context. Many countries 
emerging from conflict in the last decade have predominantly agrarian economies; 
systems of land tenure are seen as central to recovery. The World Bank identifies 
certain types of land reform with a “market friendly environment”, particularly in Africa, 
and promotes this model in post-conflict contexts. Land reform also figures as part of 
peace deals because land is often an issue in the conflict itself, even in wars that 
appear to be primarily about other issues (as in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, 
Zimbabwe and Namibia). The nature of the land reform contained in the agreement 
reflects the view of what the post-conflict society should consist of and the future role of 
agriculture within it. It may involve negotiations with international donors expected to 
underwrite its costs, who are often themselves highly influential in determining the 
outcomes. 
 
The land reform promoted by international lending organizations is almost universally 
in favour of privatized, individual land tenure arrangements. The outcome of land 
reforms with this principle at their core has universally been that women emerge with 
rights no stronger than previously, and frequently find them drastically reduced 
(Davison 1998). There are a few exceptions where an effort has been made to correct 
this imbalance – as in El Salvador – by building on existing, more flexible approaches 
which had more capacity to protect women’s land rights; but in the post-war context 
none of these lessons are typically brought on board. Planners tend to ignore the fact 
that many men who have been fighting have not been farming for a long time, and 
those who joined military forces as boys have barely any farming skills at all. By 
contrast, women have been planning and managing scarce resources under difficult 
conditions, and are often better informed about the particular local ecological 
conditions and trading opportunities. 
 
Where there is an attempt to codify and modernize previous systems of land use, there 
is a tendency to overlook the ways in which women accessed rights as daughters, 
aunts, wives, widows and mothers, and even as independent women where they are 
able to negotiate with local leaders, even if their access was typically more limited than 
that of men. New land titles tend to be granted almost exclusively to men (UNIFEM 
2001; Davison 1998), and even where there is no legal impediment to women 
purchasing such rights, and women have the resources to do so, men in their families 
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 and communities may actively discourage them from taking them up, as in Guatemala 
(UNIFEM 2001:63).  
Even where women have some access in their own right, this is usually less secure 
than men’s and often dependent on their marital status. There may also be a 
conscious prejudice on the part of planners involved in land allocations and titles, who 
may characterize rural women as poorly educated, more “backward” than men, and 
therefore not as able to take advantage of land reform opportunities. Inequalities are 
compounded by the fact that post-war rehabilitation of agriculture (usually involving the 
distribution of seeds, tools and livestock) is usually organized on a per household basis 
in which the man is always the head, even where it is clear that women’s agricultural 
production is important for food security and small-scale business (Sørenson 1998:20; 
Chingono 1996). 
 
Undermining women’s land rights, and marginalizing them in agrarian reform is not 
likely to improve food security where women retain the main responsibility for meeting 
household food needs, especially where conflict has left them heads of households. 
Thus in post-war settings, the standard approach to land reform reinforces the 
likelihood of food insecurity. Land and agrarian reform can, on the other hand, be used 
to support women’s post-war roles. The political significance of land reform and the 
strong donor influence in post-war situations ought to present positive opportunities; 
international donors have at their disposal many reports that highlight the potential 
dangers of undermining women’s land rights and the advantages of supporting them. If 
the political context is one where it is widely acknowledged that women played key 
roles during the conflict as farmers, and as managers of household resources, donors 
could be reasonably expected to highlight the advantages of their continuing to do so, 










 Women Losing Land: Post-War Land Reform in Africa and Latin America 
MOZAMBIQUE from 1997:  Women’s relatively secure access to land under 
customary law was eroded by the social disruption of war. In the increasingly market-
based economy women are more disadvantaged than men. The government 
encouraged people to “go back to the land”, but with competition over the best land, 
the new political and business elites made claims on huge tracts of land, putting extra 
stress on smallholders. Women went back to farming food out of necessity, but have 
great difficulty inheriting land, even in matrilineal parts of the country, where control is 
still vested in men. The 1997 law stipulates that women have equal rights to men, but 
implementation is weak and long-standing local practices often work against women 
(UNIFEM 2001:45-53). 
 
EL SALVADOR 1980-1992 need for land in El Salvador was ignored in post-war 
agreements, despite the efforts of women activists in the FMLN (Argueta, 1996, cited 
in Luciak, this volume). Subsequent reintegration programmes introduced a gender 
perspective and improved the situation for women, particularly ex-combatants. 
However, policy guidelines were subverted by local officials, denying women access 
to land. Land was allocated on a household basis with the title vested in the male 
household head; where women were assigned some land in their own right, it tended 
to be of poor quality. Extra requirements for receiving land included the ability to read 
and write as well as the possession of documentation such as birth certificates and 
voter registration cards. Women were among those unable to fulfil such requirements 
(Luciak this volume; Cockburn 2004:40). 
 
GUATEMALA 1990s: Women had a say in the peace agreements which facilitated 
legislation promoting land rights for women returnees and ex-combatants, at least on 
paper. Nevertheless, the objectives set up in the Guatemalan Peace Accords were not 
backed up by clear guidelines for implementation (Luciak this volume; Cockburn 
2004:40).  Consequently, many women were not able to exercise their rights because 
of “traditional male structures” (UNIFEM 2001:66). 
 
NICARAGUA 1990s: Deals were struck between Sandinistas and Contras over land 




 Urban employment  
The post-war context provides an opportunity for states to consider employment 
strategies afresh, rather than merely seeking to recover the pre-war situation and 
“reintegrate” returnees into a shattered economy. This is particularly important where 
towns and cities did not offer sufficient job opportunities before the war. Where wars 
are fought in the countryside, people tend to flee to urban areas, even while formal 
employment is severely constrained because of the disruptions of war. The public 
sector often collapses, creating problems similar to those in countries suffering 
retrenchment under public sector reforms. The private commercial sector also 
experiences difficulties due to the destruction of infrastructure, including transport, 
communications, currency controls, security, and other services (Stewart and 
Fitzgerald 2001). 
 
As recovery takes place, a prolonged shortage of male workers (due to death or 
absence) may lead to women taking up key positions and becoming a significant part 
of the workforce. However, this is unusual; the norm is for returning men to take up the 
best employment opportunities – for which on average they have better education and 
training (Sørensen 1998). Cultural arguments about women’s roles are often used to 
prevent them trying to enter the formal sector. In some cases women’s legal rights of 
access to employment may actually be curtailed by the state in the post-war context 
(Kelly 2000:62). An ILO document confirmed that in Namibia, some 60 per cent of 
women remained unemployed even two years after they had returned to the country 
(Sørensen 1998).  
 
Women ex-combatants, even where they have held very responsible positions during 
war, as in Eritrea, frequently find it harder than men to make a life in their rural homes 
and seek a living in town (Sørensen 1998:26). In the context of a backlash, they are 
particular targets for censure and may find getting work very difficult indeed. Cultural 
constraints or newly coined political versions of them also keep women away from 
employment. The lack of adequate childcare can also be an obstacle to taking up 
jobs, as female ex-combatants in Eritrea found (Sørensen 1998).   
 
The informal economy 
For women and men, earning in the aftermath of war often means relying on the 
informal economy. Women’s peace-time employment is predominantly in the informal 
economy anyway, based on trade in vegetables from the countryside, cooked food, 
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 beer, scarce goods from long-distance trade, and handicrafts. These goods offer 
relatively quick returns for small investment and do not require access to land. In war-
ravaged societies where formal trade has not yet recovered – if it had ever developed 
– these activities may be keeping society provisioned. Women entrepreneurs are 
often able to meet local urban demands for cheap food which governments cannot 
provide.  
 
In Somalia, for example, women have taken over men’s traditional roles and sold 
livestock; in Mozambique, they took to marketing fruit, fish and vegetables, and beer. 
In many countries women take on long-distance and cross-border trade, as in Chad, 
Eritrea, and Sierra Leone (Sørensen 1998:20,22). A survey of Somali refugees 
carried out by UNHCR in 1994 notes that in the absence of men, women have 
become increasingly involved in economic activity, and have acquired a virtual 
monopoly of the barter trade in food, clothing and a number of other items (UNHCR 
1994). Yet none of these trading and retailing activities tend to be supported by post-
war governments. 
 
As part of the post-war backlash against women, their retailing can actually be 
curtailed. Successful women may be socially castigated, their entrepreneurial activities 
treated as undesirable and even declared illegal. In Zimbabwe, women have created 
informal trade networks that span several countries in an attempt to supplement 
family incomes. However, this transgressing of social boundaries has resulted in their 
being branded as prostitutes and harassed at international borders (Cheater and 
Gaidzanwa 1996:191). As they have become more successful economically, male-
dominated state institutions have brought in regulations to undermine them. An 
alternative approach would be to investigate such activities and identify ways to 
support their development: many women’s businesses fail due to insufficient capital 
and skills in business management. Relief and development organizations increasingly 
seek to work with women in the post-war context and are also able to offer sources of 
income – either as direct employment or to support women’s organizations. In the post-
war countries of former Yugoslavia, women were very effective at coming together to 
establish new organizations so as to take advantage of this opportunity. 
 
The last resort for women without other gainful employment is often prostitution. In 
post-war contexts formal and informal selling of sex flourishes, particularly where there 
is an international market, such as from international peacekeepers (Bedont 2005) and 
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 international tourism (Sørenson 1998:24). Post-war countries may see very fast 
growth in the numbers of women involved, due to their lack of other opportunities, the 
presence of foreign, therefore moneyed, clients, and the degree of dislocation in social 
relationships. The dilemmas faced by post-war authorities in managing prostitution are 
therefore even more complex than usual. The most effective strategy for limiting the 
numbers of women involved would be to support their alternative endeavours in small-
scale production and trade, through the provision of training and small loans, and to 
ensure that they are included in general opportunities for training and education 
appropriate for formal sector employment. This plea has featured in major reports for 
many years, but there are still many women finding that they have little choice but to 
risk their lives in this way. Even those who are lucky enough to undergo training or 
education have to find ways to eat in the meantime (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). 
 
Health, welfare and education  
At the end of most wars, health services are very run-down and may even have 
collapsed entirely. Even where there have been valiant attempts to keep some kind of 
health provision going for children, that for adult civilians has usually been completely 
undermined. High morbidity and morality levels in a population from avoidable disease 
constitutes a serious development cost (Stewart and Fitzgerald 2001:236); however, 
expenditure on health has not yet been recognized by lending agencies as a high 
priority in considering the mechanisms for post-conflict reconstruction. Leading 
economists have called for public entitlements to health and education to be sustained 
during and after wars, particularly as primary health and education only take a fraction 
of social expenditure (Stewart and Fitzgerald 2001:237).  
 
Virtually every report on women and conflict highlights the need for health programmes 
to be specifically geared towards women, including ex-combatants, as a pre-condition 
for social recovery. Nonetheless neglect of women’s health needs during pregnancy, 
childbirth, and for rape injuries tends to be common, and this neglect has a multiplier 
effect on their difficulties in meeting the needs of dependants and other community 
members, as well as undermining their ability to participate in public life. Instead, 
women are subject to gender bias against their interests in the ways that many health 
and welfare policies work during “normal” times (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002:31-46). Injured 
women may not be able to access even the most basic elements of community support 
where they are stigmatized as a result of surviving their assaults, and/or being 
pregnant, and/or having HIV. It is still common for women (and child, especially girl) ex-
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 combatants to be relatively marginalized, if not completely neglected in such 
programmes (Farr 2003), in spite of this having been highlighted for nearly a decade.  
 
One of the most challenging areas in post-war healthcare is the need to address 
psycho-social trauma. Alcoholism, anxiety, violent and aggressive behaviour, even 
suicide, are common as a result of war-time experiences and difficulty in coming to 
terms with the post-war situation. Trauma counselling receives insufficient attention, 
and where resources are available, may be poorly designed. Research suggests that 
the employment of western medical approaches to treat such problems, by focussing 
on the individual, are not appropriate for all cultural contexts. In many predominantly 
rural societies the ways in which people experience trauma not as isolated individuals, 
but within a socially constructed context; mean that support has to take this into 
account, if not actually be provided through social relationships. Awareness is growing 
that culturally specific healing processes can be more effective in such societies 
(Sørensen, 1998:34). Where women have roles in the rituals and practices associated 
with such healing, they could be given support.  
 
Perhaps surprisingly, education is often seen by survivors of wars as a key part of 
recovery. This is partly because of a need to “return to normal”, but also because 
people recognize that for children, and even adults, education can play an important 
role in conflict prevention. Women often attempt to re-establish primary education 
themselves during and after wars, rather than wait for the state to do it. In spite of 
having this high priority in people’s minds, government spending on education is 
restricted by the same budgetary constraints as health and so rarely meets people’s 
expectations.  
 
In many countries, girls participate in education to a lesser degree than boys. Although 
this can be reversed during wars when boys may be away from home, the process of 
rehabilitating educational provision usually finds the proportion swing back again once 
boys return (Stewart et al. 2001:103). There are many ways in which unequal access 
to education reinforces gender inequalities and this is therefore a useful point of 
intervention to foster future positive change. The education of girls and women is vital if 
women are ever going to be able to participate effectively in peace negotiations, post-
war planning and public life. Even where women are included in peace negotiations, 
they are at a strong disadvantage where they do not even have primary education 
while most other key players have been at least to secondary school. 
29 
  
Where peace education is taken seriously as part of the new curriculum, this frees 
women from what might be seen as a private responsibility (that of educating their 
children for peace) and makes of it a public activity in which men can also play a part. 
Where peace education also contains explorations of gender issues, this can have a 
long-term impact on the overall transformation of gender relations in ways connected 
and unconnected to war. 
 
Conclusion 
For more than a decade, the UN has proclaimed that women’s needs deserve 
greater attention in the post-war context. Yet the problems, rights abuses and 
programme shortcomings documented in many old reports remain commonplace.19 
The plight of women during war, particularly the scale of their sexual violation, has 
attracted international attention, and is often used to characterize the barbarism of 
mankind or brutality of particular “enemy” groups. Women’s roles in working to end 
conflicts are increasingly celebrated – even if other roles are downplayed. As a 
consequence, women participants in post-war peace-building have been thrust into 
unprecedented prominence by certain international organizations. Yet for all this 
visibility, women usually remain marginal, as a group or as individuals, in peace 
negotiations, in consultations about post-war strategies, and in the public life of post-
war societies. 
 
The persistent reluctance of many analysts and advisers to take on board lessons 
about gender analysis and its incorporation into policy processes in the post-war 
setting needs to be recorded, and further effort is needed to overcome this thoughtless, 
or deliberate, resistance. This can itself be seen as part of the backlash against 
women, helping to allow, if not facilitate, the playing out of intense gender politics in 
households, communities and the wider world. Feminist histories of conflicts, and 
feminist studies of development, provide a rich store of relevant experiences, both 
positive and negative. These have been collated and analysed for several years and 
comprise a significant literature; but they are still not taken sufficiently seriously by 
many of the key international actors in the context of post-war activity. 
 
                                                
19 For instance, see UN, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 
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 In the future it is to be hoped that international agencies and donors will be better 
prepared to take opportunities to put these lessons about how to mitigate injustices 
for women centre-stage when advising and supporting post-war recovery 
programmes – in political, governance, economic and social spheres alike. As more 
successes are achieved, it is also to be hoped that post-war governments will more 
readily see the advantages in developing polices that not only support women’s 
efforts to survive, but enable them to fulfil their potential in helping rebuild their 




 PART II 
 
POST-WAR BACKLASH VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: 
WHAT CAN ‘MASCULINITY’ EXPLAIN? 
 
The chapters in this volume have illustrated that women often face common 
challenges in a wide range of locations emerging from war and violent conflict. In 
seeking justice for crimes committed against them during and after wars; in engaging 
with “truth and reconciliation” endeavours, and in attempting to re-build their lives 
they are often faced with the forces of constraint, if not attack, from men, from society 
and from the state.20 In this final chapter I re-visit the phenomenon of the “post-war 
backlash”, and its particular components of violence against women and restrictions 
on attempts to re-build their lives. Whilst the backlash phenomenon is commonly 
noted, it is rare for explanations to be offered. I then go on to consider such 
explanations as there are, and in particular consider the concept of masculinity and 
assess its potential explanatory power for post-war violence against women.  
 
The concept of a backlash has been used in feminist writings for a long time as being 
integral to political processes: after women make political and socio-economic gains, 
at some point a backlash against these gains becomes likely, if not inevitable.21 What 
is perhaps particular to a post-war backlash is the speed and dramatic force with 
which it can come. It often comes after periods of social change along with 
distressing and traumatic experiences for most people, but which happen just at the 
moment when everyone expects life to be improving. Of course, wars do not tend to 
suddenly stop even where there is an effective ceasefire, but for men there is usually 
quite quickly a change in levels of violence, particularly for combatants. For women 
by contrast there is sometimes a continuity of difficulties they faced during war, 
leading some observers to say there is no distinct aftermath to wars for women 
(Meintjes et al. 2001b:3), and this can also be combined with new forms of violence 
which together constitute a backlash against women, as described in Chapter One. 
 
Violence against women often persists, or even increases beyond, pre-war levels 
and sometimes even beyond war-time levels. Rises in domestic violence are 
                                                
20 Women’s violence has to some extent been hidden in non-war society (Segal, 1990: 260) and in 
conflict (Jacobs et al. 2000; Moser and Clark 2001; Turshen and Twagiramariya 1998). Nonetheless no 
one is arguing that it is not the case that men commit the bulk of violence and that violence from men to 
women far outweighs that in the other direction. 
21 For example, ‘Change is never smooth, uniform, or free from contradiction and backlash’ (Segal 
1990:272; Segal 1999:117) 
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 common, along with sexual violence in the locality, perpetuated by not only young 
men who are ex-combatants and gang members, for instance, but also employees of 
the local state, such as the police, and other young men, often with access to cheap 
guns,22 which leads one commentator to remark:   
The overwhelming pervasiveness of violence against women points to 
collusion among societal forces that could well be described as a conspiracy 
to maintain the low status of women in society in order to lessen the perceived 
threat that one can only assume women must pose to men economically, 
socially, politically (Pillay 2001:43). 
 
In this atmosphere, not surprisingly, it is difficult for women to hold men to account for 
human rights abuses committed against them during war. Sometimes processes 
make this difficult for women through “benign neglect” (Dal Secco, this volume; 
Manjoo, this volume), but in others it appears more deliberate (Nowrojee, this 
volume), where such activities are explicitly seen as unimportant. In this context 
many women seek reconciliation with men on terms that require them to give up 
socio-economic or political gains, as well as the pursuit of justice, for the sake of 
negotiating a manageable life (Luciak, this volume; El Bushra 2000). 
 
The backlash phenomenon is mentioned in numerous reports and published works 
which are concerned with women or are written by feminists and even without an 
extreme backlash, there are sufficient examples documented for us to know that 
post-war issues will be different for women and men such as: voter registration, 
political party nomination, giving evidence in court, seeking employment, education, 
travel, for instance. Knowing that these challenges, and a political backlash, are likely 
in a post-war context means that allies of women need to promote special, targeted  
interventions to ameliorate these inequalities and injustices, but the phenomenon still 
tends to be ignored in policy circles. Such targeted approaches might in future 
coincide with imperatives for efficiency in supporting reconstruction efforts23 but to 
date implementation of such measures is very slow indeed.24
 
Analytically it is challenging to consider which particular factors determine the nature 
(or even existence) of such a backlash. The following are probably key factors: the 
duration of conflict; type of warfare and military force; the degree and types of 
                                                
22 Kandiyoti, this volume; Cockburn 2001:18. Leave aside here the violence committed by UN 
peacekeepers, who are by definition coming from outside the community (Bedont 2005; Väyrynen, 
2001) 
23 Bouta et al 2005 reviews gender, conflict and development with the World Bank’s concerns in mind. 
24 See IRIN 2004 for many examples 
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 violence; the degree and type of social change, including the extent of the 
participation of women in armed combat; the political agenda of government; the 
nature of involvement of the international community, and, perhaps crucially, what 
was socially “normal” in pre-war society with regard to gender relations. Yet there is 
no obvious pattern about what factors determine the timing or shape of a backlash, 
even women’s rights and freedoms in pre-war society, and we do not share an 
understanding of why men behave differently towards women after wars, or why 
women are so often unable to resist (Meintjes et al. 2001). Perhaps future research 
will shed more light on this. It is certainly difficult to seek overarching explanations for 
something which is not uniformly expressed - in some countries the backlash 
appears very obviously and dramatically, and is accompanied by violence. In others it 
is more subtle, and there is a complex rather than obvious connection between what 
is done at the level of the state and what women experience in the workplace, street 
and household.25  
 
Nonetheless it is not uncommon for people to conclude accounts such as those in 
this volume by calling for changes in the way women and men are socialised, as they 
see the root cause of problems for women in the aftermath or backlash as being 
something to do with the way “the construction of masculinity” takes place (for 
example Pillay 2001:41). This is also true of some writers within the development 
field who identify masculinity and gender relations as the root causes of gender 
inequalities in development.26 The term “masculinity” is used with increasing 
frequency in the conflict / post-conflict literature and generally refers to prevailing 
cultural and social norms about men’s behaviour. “Masculinity” has a simple 
explanatory appeal as being something to do with men, as distinct from women. In 
this context it tends to be talked of in the abstract, in a functionalist way, as if men 
have no agency; as inevitable; and with little possibility for positive change. Its use is 
not generally well-developed theoretically or conceptually; masculinity may refer to a 
discourse, men’s actual behaviour, the cultural values of individuals and institutions 
etc. “Explanations” for a backlash are sometimes described as being an inevitable 
outcome of a “crisis of masculinity”, but this phrase is given very different meanings 
by different authors, as I shall illustrate. The conflict / post-conflict literature also 
                                                
25 A recent backlash might be said to have occurred at the level of international discourse in the attack 
on ‘the gender perspective on war’ by the Human Security Centre’s Human Security Report (2005) 
mentioned in the Introduction to this volume. Major gains have been made at the international level in 
giving recognition to the previously hidden and ignored impact of conflict and its long-term effects on 
women, and some clout given to the need to recognise this in post-war recovery planning and justice 
frameworks, and so perhaps we should have also expected a backlash at the international level.  
26 For example, Cleaver 2000, and in some other cross-cultural studies, for example Steans 1998: 81-
103; Lentin 1997. 
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 tends to ignore research which seeks to explain precisely why men commit violence 
against known women’27 and sexual violence against other women. Such research is 
predominantly undertaken in the West, in non-war28 locations, and is sometimes, but 
not always, located in discourses about “masculinity”. In the next section I review key 
elements of this non-war research, and conceptual debates about masculinity, with a 
view to considering what insights it might give us into war and post-war contexts. 
 
The study of men, masculinity and non-war violence against women 
It is commonly stated in this body of work that although women do commit violent 
acts,29 the vast majority of violence is committed by men, and a significant, albeit 
varied, proportion of that is committed against women. Stanko (2003) argues strongly 
against seeking overall explanations for all men’s violences and instead proposes 
that we seek to understand the specificities of particular occurrences of violence. 
Such a position is reinforced by her earlier work which proposed that we should 
conceive of violence to include a very broad range of phenomena, such as an 
infliction of “emotional, psychological, sexual, physical, and/or material damage” 
(Stanko 1994: xiv).  The World Health Organisation has argued that a key element in 
its use of such violence is the use of ‘power, whether threatened or actual’ (World 
Health Organisation, 2002: 5). Stanko and other writers30 have expanded on this 
further to reach a definition which is very broad indeed, thereby making it less likely 
to find mono-causal explanations. Attempts to narrow down or to grade degrees of, 
violence are however almost impossible. Seeing violence as a continuum has some 
merit, but there is no common understanding of a rank order on such a continuum. 
Stanko gives a challenging example of how difficult this would be where teenage 
girls, who were themselves engaging in as well as being victims of violence, 
identified verbal abuse as being more intimidating than quite serious physical attack 
(Stanko 2003:7). 
 
Perhaps the most in-depth study of men’s violence to known women in the UK is 
Hearn (1998), which is based on detailed interviews with men convicted of such 
violence in Britain. He stakes out a position against seeking mono-causal 
explanations or even frameworks: 
There are many different explanations of men’s violence to known women. 
Biological explanations may emphasize “hormonal patterns” and “aggression”“ 
                                                
27 The useful term ‘known women’ was coined by Hearn, 1998: 37-8 
28  I use this term, rather than ‘peace’, because that is somewhat of an oxymoron for the women 
enduring or being killed by such violence. 
29 Research in Sweden suggests that women are becoming more criminally violent and this is thought to 
lie behind a lower rate of ‘date rape’ compared to USA (Gill 2001: 411).  
30 For example Hearn 1998:15-17; Kelly 1998; Segal 1990:244-5 
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 socio-biology may conceptualize violence in relation to “territory” and its 
“defence”; psychology may introduce “personality types” or “disorders” and 
“personal constructs”; psychoanalysis may hypothesize “projection” and 
“displacement”. Sociology, anthropology, political science and economics all 
tend to use concepts that are grounded in interpersonal, collective, 
institutional, structural or societal processes. These may include “poverty”, 
“stress”, “alienation”, sub-culture” and so on. With all of these explanations, 
there are problems. Moreover, while it is quite possible to identify individual, 
family, cultural, economic, structural and other causes or explanations of 
violence, the search for a final or original cause may be futile (Hearn 1998:17) 
 
And he insists in the conclusion to his study that multiple explanations must co-exist 
(Hearn 1998:210) citing a useful comment from Goldner et al. (1990:345): “To say 
violence, domination, subordination and victimization are psychological does not 
mean they are not also moral, material or legal.” Hearn helpfully suggests that a way 
forward might lie in identifying different types of explanation for different types of 
violence (1998:210) although this work has still to be done and so I offer a brief 
review of relevant approaches below. 
 
The most common biological explanation offered is probably the link between higher 
testosterone levels and aggressive behaviour (Whitehead and Barrett 2005:11 cite 
Clare 2000:22). The argument’s weakness is in not being able to generalise; not all 
males are aggressive and violent, and “men are not puppets of their hormones” 
(Whitehead and Barrett 2005:15-16) and whilst being compelling to some, it is rarely 
seen as the most important explanation in social science (Seifert 1999:146). Closely 
linked to this perspective is what might be termed a socio-biological explanation, 
which argues that men have evolved to be more aggressive than women as part of 
the process of becoming socially dominant. Whilst this approach occasionally has 
popular appeal, it does not sustain a position of support in social science (Seifert 
1999:146-7; Lövkrona 2001:356-8). 
 
Psychological and psychiatric explanations for violence are located in identity 
formation and they too have sometimes resorted to a framework in which the 
dominance and violence of men is taken as given. Nonetheless studies from within 
these disciplines have shown that there are very strong patterns of correlation 
between men who commit violence and specific life experiences, particularly those of 
childhood. In trying to scale-up general explanations from individual case studies, 
however, psychological / psychiatric frameworks have a challenge to explain why not 
all men with similar backgrounds in similar circumstances commit violence against 
women. Connell suggests nonetheless that there is more explanatory potential in 
quite old psychoanalytical studies than has been developed so far in our 
understanding of men’s behaviour. He suggests that although the science is often 
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 cast as a theory of the individual, it is much more like a social science because case 
studies are “all about relationships that constitute the person, the prohibitions and 
possibilities that emerge in that most extraordinary and complex of social processes, 
the raising of one generation of humans by another…” (Connell 1994:33-4). He 
summarizes the contributions thus:  
Freud’s idea about the importance of castration anxiety, Adler’s argument 
about overcompensation, Jung’s suggestions about the gender dynamics of 
marriages, Horney’s and Dinnerstein’s arguments about the importance of 
boys’ fears of the mother, the Frankfurt School’s ideas about the impact of 
family power structure and societal alienation, Chodorow’s ideas about 
emotional separation, Lacanian arguments about the oedipal ordering of 
symbolization, are all useful lines of thought. To treat one of them as the a 
priori framework for a theory of masculinity would be to misuse 
psychoanalysis … But deployed in the detail of cases … [including] 
collectivities and institutions … these ideas will greatly enrich understanding 
of the social dynamics. (Connell 1994:33) 
 
In attempts to scale-up findings from individual cases, Connell (1994:29) describes 
how the Frankfurt School in exile from Germany in New York, published work which 
sought to understand fascism:  
The underlying idea was that fascist movement managed to tap hidden 
psychological pre-dispositions with roots in the emotional dynamics of 
childhood. The key pattern identified was a combination of conformity to 
authority from above and aggression toward those below. These traits were 
traced back to harsh and loveless parenting, dominance of the family by the 
father, sexual and emotional repression, and highly conventional morality.  
 
The school also contrasted this with a “democratic character” which was an important 
breakaway to suggest that there was more than one type of masculinity. “The idea of 
multiple masculinities … finds a precise meaning, and some of its strongest 
evidence, in psychoanalysis” (Connell 1994:33).  
 
Building on this historic legacy, Chodorow went on to develop a feminist perspective 
in psychoanalysis, which identified the importance of the process of mother-
separation (1978) and, along with several other authors31, argued that where women 
are the primary carers of children, “boys must define themselves in opposition to their 
mothers in order to become ‘men’, [and so] mother-raised men will develop a 
disproportionately ‘oppositional’ orientation within which connection with the other will 
be sacrificed to separation from the other” (Balbus 2002:211).    
 
Chodorow has made a very influential contribution to understanding men’s violence 
to women, but, as Balbus argues, her approach does not look at the quality or detail 
of parenting – either under normal patterns or to see the potential of co-parenting, 
                                                
31 cited in Balbus 2002:210 
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 which more conventional psychoanalysis does (Balbus 2002:212). That the individual 
predisposition of men to commit violence is related to their upbringing is now 
generally supported (Hearn 1998:31) however. Psychological and psychiatric 
analyses also point to a link between male violence and childhood trauma, and in this 
way violence being reproduced between generations (Hearn 1998:26). Hearn sees 
this as opening the way to recognition of the “cycles of violence” and “cultures of 
violence” theses (Hearn 1998:26), although not all men, let alone people, respond to 
similar childhood traumas in the same way and so this also does not scale-up very 
simply. One problem with the “cycle of violence” thesis is that almost everyone can 
be defined as coming from a violent household if the definition of violence is 
sufficiently broad, as in Stanko’s definition cited above. Further, studies do not tend 
to look at siblings from same household to see if they also commit violence, so it is 
still difficult to see explanations other than at the very general level. 
 
There is a large body of work that concludes or implies that all men are potential 
rapists and commit domestic violence (including murder) in the absence of 
constraints to prevent them – not because of a biological predisposition to violence, 
or because of their individual circumstances, but because they have a dominant role 
to play in a patriarchal society vis-à-vis women and children. Dobash and Dobash’s 
book (1979) was a path-breaker in this field. The authors looked at domestic violence 
and highlighted its often hidden yet high incidence, which included murder. They 
cited evidence from England and Wales 1885-1905 where over 50 percent of all 
murder victims were women with long-standing relationships with the male murderer 
(1979:15-16), and studies in the 1950s and 1960s which showed that it was 
husbands who committed the vast majority of women’s murders.32 Whilst a more 
common crime was assault committed by men on other men, at the time of writing, 
the extent of violence against women partners was not widely acknowledged, and 
was in fact the second most common violent offence in Scotland (Dobash and 
Dobash 1979:20). They argued against the prevailing assumption that the only 
reason women suffered more at men’s hands was because they were weaker, but 
rather: 
…the correct interpretation of violence between husbands and wives 
conceptualizes such violence as the extension of the domination and control of 
husbands over their wives. This control is historically and social constructed. 
The beginning of an adequate analysis of violence between husbands and 
                                                
32 Dobash and Dobash 1979:17. This overall pattern still holds in the UK today, in that most ‘partner’ 
murders are committed by men on women, as graphically illustrated by The Guardian special report, 10 
December 2005; and 42 per cent of all female victims of homicide in the UK are killed by a former or 
current partner (The Guardian, 4 October 2006). Furthermore the Council of Europe recently stated that 
domestic violence is the biggest cause of death and disability for all women in the EU under 44 years 
(The Guardian, 4 October 2006). Similar patters are seen elsewhere in the world (WHO, 2002: 92) 
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 wives is the consideration of the history of the family, of the status of women 
therein, and of violence directed against them. (Dobash and Dobash 1979:15) 
 
From studies undertaken in other parts of Europe they argued that such violence 
against wives was cross-cultural, and was part of the dominant culture, rather than 
part of a sub-culture as some writers had suggested (Dobash and Dobash 1979:22), 
“men who assault their wives are actually living up to cultural prescriptions that are 
cherished in Western society – aggressiveness, make dominance and female 
subordination – and they are using physical force as a means to enforce that 
dominance” (Dobash and Dobash 1979:24). Dobash and Dobash did acknowledge 
the importance of psychological studies of violence with regard to seeing the use of 
violence as a learned response (when coming from a violent family context, for 
instance), but explicitly rejected the conclusions of psychoanalysis which identified 
such behaviour as pathological or deviant, or identified the behaviour of the wife as 
being significant.(Dobash and Dobash 1979:22-3, 135).  
 
Dobash and Dobash were writing within a feminist perspective which was developed 
by many authors33 and which described how, within a system of capitalist patriarchy, 
all men are potentially, if not actually, violent to women, especially in the home, 
where violence is seen as a continuum of different behaviours and includes verbal 
aggression. While explicitly identifying a socio-political, rather than biological, cause, 
such perspectives regard the outcome of this particular social system as being that a 
person’s sex determines their social location in terms of patriarchal domination 
backed up by violence. This perspective has also tended to downplay or even reject 
work on the psychologies of men, in relation to their personal and family upbringing, 
and instead emphasised the universal experience of men being part of a dominant 
group. Concurring with this overall view, but placing the explanatory weight 
somewhat differently, Hearn suggests in his conclusion that: 
Men’s violence to women is not just a given structure; it is a structure, a 
process, a set of practical actions and an outcome of men’s societal 
domination – of what may be called as a shorthand “patriarchy’. Such violence 
is a structure of patriarchal relations in itself; a patriarchal process and an 
outcome of other forms of patriarchal domination. For example, other 
patriarchal structures, such as heterosexuality, fatherhood, and the state 
(Hearn 1998) may all be maintained and sometimes intensified by men’s 
violence (Hearn 1996:209, original emphasis). 
 
In other words men’s violence is an integral part of patriarchy but Hearn in this way 
avoids the tautology of saying that the existence of patriarchy explains the particular 
features of men’s violence. 
 
                                                
33 For example, Brownmiller 1975; Dworkin 1982; Millet 1972 
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 The importance of social context in differentiating men’s likely behaviour was picked 
up by Segal (1990:241-242), who suggests that in concluding that all men are 
potentially rapists, Dobash and Dobash had misunderstood a much-cited study by 
Amir in the USA (Amir 1971, cited in Segal 1990:241-2). Amir did show that all the 
men in a study of rapists were apparently psychologically normal, and had girlfriends, 
but the majority were from poor, low status backgrounds. Segal (1990:245) goes on 
to argue that the interaction of social class and social stress – in the form of 
unemployment, underemployment, number of children, and social isolation, “all 
contribute to violence from men” (1990:255). Evidence from USA and UK shows that 
violence against women predominates in circumstances of poverty, but also where 
women gain economic independence and men are unemployed (Segal 1990:257). 
Furthermore, Segal identified wives’ lack of resources to escape from a violent 
relationship as one of the serious issues that blocks its prevention (1990:256).  
 
Seeking to explain the variety of men’s behaviours led to both a re-visiting of 
psychological explanations and an attempt to combine this with focus on changes in 
what society expects of men. Segal suggests that in the 1950s absent fathers gave 
boys “role anxiety” which led to “a compensatory ‘hypermasculinity’, a fear of 
weakness, and a tendency towards delinquency and educational under-achievement” 
(1990:65)  but by the 1960s there was much less pressure on roles. In other words 
what is introduced here is the notion of change. She emphasised that during the 
nineteenth century:  
Coleridge’s intellectual and emotional earnestness … was soon competing 
with far harsher versions of middle class  masculinity … English manliness 
based on ‘toughness of muscle’ and ‘toughness of heart’ in mid-Victorian 
England in which fighting became glorified. (Segal 1990:106)  
 
 
So whilst we, 
cannot neatly periodise early and late-Victorian ideals of manhood (nor those 
of any other epoch), it is nevertheless evident that competition between 
competing ideals intensified with the increasing glorification of a more 
muscular, militaristic masculinity, in alliance with British imperialist expansion 
in the late Victorian era .. Shelley, Keats and even Shakespeare, were to be 
attacked as weak, morbid and effeminate. (Segal 1990:106-7) 
 
She also points out that the prevalence of rape is not constant through history in the 
same countries; eighteenth century Massachusetts did not show increases in rape, 
even in war-time (Segal 1990:238), and there were calmer periods in UK and USA 
history. At the time of her writing, the rates in USA had risen to previously 
unprecedented levels, leading her to wonder, “might not rape be the deformed 
behaviour of men accompanying the destabilisation of gender relations … now at 
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 their peak in modern America?”(Segal1990:240). This sense of social change 
causing changes in men’s behaviour is picked up in more conceptual discussions 
about men and masculinity (Kimmel 1994:120). There would seem to be certain 
circumstances under which violence by men, particularly against women, increases. 
The example of Sweden suggests that such key moments may occur even in 
contexts of comparatively low male dominance.34   
 
In addition to the possibilities that men’s behaviour norms change over time, a 
conceptual framework where different masculinities co-exist has become more 
common. Not only is it accepted that there are different masculinities in different parts 
of the world (which themselves may change over time) but that in any one place 
there is such a thing as “hegemonic masculinity”. Kimmel (1994:125) cites Connell’s 
version of hegemonic masculinity (Connell 1987), which does not mention violence, 
but then himself adds the comment, “Violence is often the single most evident marker 
of manhood. Rather it is the willingness to fight, the desire to fight” (Kimmel 
1994:132). The attractiveness of this framework includes the fact that it allows 
intellectual space for individual men’s behaviour to vary, but within an acknowledged 
context of common experience. Munn (2005) proposes that we see hegemonic 
masculinity as a standard against which others are judged – not as a set of values or 
behaviour norms that all men have to comply with or even agree to. This framework 
allows for the fact that idealized versions of manhood in western society never fit 
some men’s experiences, for example in work, relations with women, sexual activity 
etc. (Whitehead and Barrett 2005:19 cite Jefferson 1994). They nonetheless may 
benefit from “the hegemonic project” and many are actively complicit with it, so it 
includes, “men who cheer at football matches on TV … [as well as] those who run out 
into the mud and take the tackles themselves” (Connell 2005:40-41). 
The term hegemonic is obviously derived from Gramsci’s conceptualisation of 
hegemony, as the outcome of social struggle between groups or classes to 
dominate; described by Connell (2005:38) as the “cultural dynamic by which a group 
claims and sustains a leading position in social life”, and that which is “culturally 
exalted” by others (Connell 2005:38). He argues for using the term in the singular 
(2005:38-39), as though it is universal and global; a conceptualisation which requires 
cultural dominance to coincide with the holding of power. But he also suggests 
(2005:47 footnote 15) that although others came to see hegemony in this way as 
functionalist, one may alternatively follow Gramsci more closely in seeing hegemony 
                                                
34 Lövkrona (2001:362) identifies one piece of research which suggests that 67 per cent of Swedish 
women have been abused by men, even though its publication prompted outrage and vociferous denial 
in public arenas. 
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 as a site of struggle and potential change, and that, “hegemonic masculinity 
embodies a “currently accepted” strategy, and that at different times particular groups 
of men can be challenged and the basis for hegemony changed” (Connell 2005:39). 
In addition to hegemonic masculinity being open to change over time, people also 
conceive of it being accompanied simultaneously with subordinate, or marginal 
masculinities (for example Connell 2000:7; Whitehead and Barrett 2005:18), and, 
even “systems of masculinities”, such as in colonial India (Enloe 2005). In expanding 
on such structures and systems, it is again difficult to avoid being functionalist; the 
subordinate and dominant masculinities seem to exist and relate to each other in 
order to support a specific patriarchal system (such as that of a colonial state), but 
that does not explain why they are precisely the way they are.   
 
At this level of abstraction we are very far removed from what motivates some men to 
behave more or less violently to women. Furthermore the analysis almost completely 
eclipses women, who appear only as victims. On the face of it, such frameworks are 
limited in the same way as those which rely on the existence of patriarchy to explain 
everything. If we simply identify a package of masculine identities, behaviours and 
characteristics with actually existing, socially specific patriarchy (or, even more 
simplistically, see these as universal) then we quickly end up in a tautology which 
cannot explain anything. If we say that hegemonic masculinity is the way it is 
because that is the key way in which patriarchy is maintained and gender inequality 
perpetuated, this cannot explain how and why masculinities in fact vary in time and 
space, and even though it allows for the possibility of different experiences it cannot 
explain the variety.  
 
Instead it can be useful to recognise that certain types of masculinities (in the sense 
of preferred and celebrated identities, behaviours and characteristics) do emerge in 
different societies at key moments and that these can be relational and therefore one 
or some can be dominant – in the sense of being the most commonly aspired to and 
valued. I have described how some writers consider that the nature of hegemonic 
masculinity changes at moments of great economic, political and social upheaval. 
The usefulness of this approach is that it allows one to see that there are multiple 
ways of being a man and that some may encourage or condone more violence 
against women than others. Also conceptually such work allows for change, although 
most examples in the West are about very long, slow processes of historic change, 




 Finally, the concept of “masculinity in crisis” has been used for a long time about 
western societies not at war, but is now being applied elsewhere, wherever “men 
become violent, or anti-social in other ways, as women become more liberated. In 
other words a form of backlash against social change” (Gill 2001:411). The 
expression tends to be used in a casual way, but as Whitehead and Barrett (2005:6) 
suggest, for many people the “crisis of masculinity” had become the defining 
characteristic of Western societies at the turn of the millennium; men seemed to be in 
crisis, because even if they do not resort to negative behaviour to women, they still 
“yearn to perform and validate their masculinity through “conquering the 
universe”…[and] the aggressive, dominant, emotionally repressed behaviour that 
such yearnings engender are increasingly seen as (self-) destructive, if not 
desirable”. They suggest that three main reasons are usually given for men’s crisis: 
1) consumerism; 2) women’s successful attacks on men’s privileges; 3) widespread 
social disapproval of the old ways of behaving. They then critique these assumptions 
along these lines: 1) women are also subject to consumerism, and arguably more 
vulnerable; 2) men still dominate in the main bastions of power and openly challenge 
women’s attempts to change this; 3) the “fashion” of masculinities is changing, but it 
always has been, and this does not stop masculinity retaining much of its previous 
character (Whitehead and Barrett 2005:7). Many men still “act dominant and “hard”, 
deny their emotions, resort to violence as a means of self-expression, and seek to 
validate their masculinity in the public world of work rather than the private world of 
family and relationships” (Whitehead and Barrett 2005:7). They go on to point out 
that this behaviour is still lauded by many men and women, and therefore can hardly 
be said to be in danger of fundamental change.  
 
Whitehead and Barrett also point out that the “crisis of masculinity” goes back to the 
eighteenth century in Europe, and has previously peaked at times of social concern 
about major issues such as “possible war, economic recession, rises in crime, 
educational underachievement, or the moral fabric of a nation” (Whitehead and 
Barrett 2005:8, my emphasis). At such moments, “what emerges, in fact, is a moral 
panic around men and masculinity, which can quickly turn into a backlash against 
women and feminism” (Whitehead and Barrett 2005:8, citing Lingard and Douglas 
1999). This surely is a strong parallel with the ending of conflicts where gender roles 
for both have been altered and a new life is not perceived as better or good enough. 
 
In conclusion, systemic explanations for men’s violence and how masculinity is 
conceived, shaped and perpetuated are still common in the analysis of non-war, 
western societies, many of which make generalisations about all men’s potential 
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 capacity for violence against women. As not all men behave in the same way such 
overall explanations remain problematic. Over time, the dominant identity of men 
described as hegemonic masculinity, and men’s behaviour with regard to violence, is 
seen to change, although it is not clear why, how, or whether such change is 
inevitable with specific shifts in circumstance. The same behaviour is sometimes 
described as “crisis of masculinity” and so the debate continues as to whether this 
should be regarded as normal / dominant behaviour or exceptional and a crisis 
reaction. 
 
There are few examples discussed of how masculinity changes to make violence 
less prevalent, or less socially acceptable, and violence against women at home and 
in the street has become and remains very high in parts of non-war western 
society35. The specific social circumstances of men, and particularly those of 
childhood, and the ways these affect the psychologies of men, have been shown 
consistently in long-term studies to correlate with violent behaviour, even though 
violent behaviour is itself not pre-determined by such experiences. This important 
dimension is nonetheless often completely omitted from systemic explanations which 
do not readily account for processes of change in general behaviour and values over 
time.  
 
The study of masculinity and violence in conflict / post-conflict settings 
This section of the chapter reviews “explanations” for violence against women during 
and after wars. Accounts of all types of war-related violence tend to be based on 
what is said by victims/ survivors36, witnesses and to a lesser extent, perpetrators, 
without following Hearn’s warning of not taking these descriptions at face-value 
(Hearn 1998:213). Analyses on the whole are not well-grounded in theory or 
extensive empirical research, either with victims/survivors or perpetrators. They 
                                                
35 particularly in parts of the USA, for instance. One might debate whether the USA might be considered 
a ‘non-war’ context. Some might argue that poor inner-city areas have experienced periods of war-like 
violence, although in this case the nature and amount of violence does not indicate clear protagonists as 
most has been committed by and on poor young men living in the same areas. Technically the USA has 
been at war with other states most of the time since World War Two, but the battlefields have generally 
not been on US territory. 
36 There are interesting variations in the use of these terms. Post-holocaust literature tends to refer to 
victims as those who died, and survivors as those who did not. In post-WW2 France, it was ‘victims’ who 
brought cases of collaborators, (Lottman 1986:286-7). In Western psychotherapy, the term survivor is 
used to refer to, and claimed by, people who have reached a ‘healthy’ understanding of their 
experiences. It is common in Palestine to reject the term victim in favour of ‘hero’ (Bacic 2002:19). In 
South Africa the discourse around the TRC talked of victims of apartheid because that is what appeared 
in the TRC legislation (Hamber et al. 2000:18), and so ‘victim/survivor’ was adopted by those preferring 
the more positive term. Hamber has recently argued that there is a ‘steady embrace of the concept of 
“victim” rather than it being something which is shunned’ (2003:8), particularly in Northern Ireland 
(2003:18). By contrast, in Rwanda the local versions of these terms have taken on a highly politicised 
edge where survivor is officially sanctioned only for survivors of attempted genocide, and not for other 
forms of violence (Sasaki 2004). Also see discussion by Mani (2002:119-123). 
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 therefore ignore, or tend to dismiss, psychological explanations derived from 
research in non-war settings and also ignore some key socio-political theories.  
 
Moser (2001:38-40), for instance, summarises non-war explanations, and groups 
them into structural, institutional, inter-personal, individual categories. Insofar as she 
also considers that none of the non-war analyses is adequate alone she concurs with 
the broad approach taken by Hearn and others described above, but she only makes 
scanty use of this work and her summaries are somewhat misleading. She identifies 
as key from amongst these non-war explanations social/gender power relations and 
the fact that wives often have practical difficulties when trying to leave violent 
partners. Her position then is very similar to Dobash and Dobash, but even these 
latter authors noted the relevance of psychological explanations for understanding 
and explaining some elements of domestic violence, whereas Moser appears to 
dismiss them out of hand. 
 
“During” and “after” war explanations for men’s violence against women are often the 
same and, although such accounts often state that the explanation is social (such as 
in “constructions of masculinity”), they tend to assume that there is something distinct 
about war-related circumstances that lead to increased violence against women. At 
one level this seems self-evident as some forms of violence are almost completely 
absent outside the context of war. In examples where violence against women 
continues or even increases after wars end, the causes and meanings that observers 
give it may change. Sideris (2001b:144, 146-8) for instance, argues that war-time 
rape takes place in public whereas afterwards it may well continue but takes place in 
private, which suggests a different motivation and purpose. As a generalisation this 
may be the case, but such a distinction ignores the rape and other violence against 
women that takes place in private during war, and rapes and other violence that 
continue to occur in public afterwards. Other explanations of post-war violence are 
often rooted in the belief that the “aftermath of war” is a distinct social moment where 
some of the war-time dynamics continue (Meinjes et al. 2001). Below I review these 
explanations in the light of non-war analyses. 
 
Perhaps the most common categorisation of rape and other violence against women 
civilians during wars is as “war booty”; it is accepted that the enemy’s women are fair 
game. This is not really an explanation, but a description of the justification often 
given for such violence, and does not begin to analyse why men have the desire for 
such acts. It is also common for this justification, and wartime levels of violence 
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 against women, to last after wars have officially ended. Seifert suggests that this 
often continues for one to two months after victory, giving the examples of Berlin in 
1945 and Nanking in 1937 (Seifert 1999:147). 
 
We might link the “war-booty” thesis with a set of other explanations which propose 
that such behaviour is often part of a deliberate military strategy intended to build the 
morale of soldiers, and to increase male bonding, together perhaps best described 
as a feature of “militarism”. This is a persuasive analysis which has been researched 
and promoted most notably by Cynthia Enloe (1989, 1993, 1998, 2000, 2004) and 
picked up by many other writers,37 although she is always careful not to over-simplify 
the issues. It is not sufficient as an explanation for all wartime violence against 
women though, as the incidence of rape tends to be higher with irregular, 
undisciplined armies, in wars where there is not a sharp division between military and 
civilian personnel (Turshen 2001b:12). A linked, but distinct, military strategy is to use 
violence against women, and particularly that of public rape, to undermine the 
enemy. Its success relies on strongly patriarchal social relations amongst enemy 
populations so that such acts not only harm “enemy women” but also undermine 
“enemy men” by demonstrating their inability to protect “their” women, 38 against 
“rape as a weapon of war”. 
  
A more general and highly pervasive assumption about men’s violence against 
women during wars is that such violence, particularly sexual violence, is an 
inevitability if social constraints on men’s behaviour are removed39. The assumption 
is that men will behave like this simply because their social dominance means they 
can. This “constraints removed” thesis is also said to explain partner-violence both at 
“the front” and in society. It is an extremely common assumption which appears in 
journalists’ accounts as well as those of academics. Men’s violent urges are seen as 
being biologically and socially driven to such an extent that men have no control over 
them, almost having the tag “natural”. This bio-social connection between violence 
and sex40 also has resonance with the Dobash and Dobash argument about non-war 
societies described above, where men are assumed to be violent against women 
when they are not restrained because they are the dominant group. The HSC report 
cited earlier (Human Security Centre 2005; see also Goldstein 2001) embraces this 
                                                
37 For example, De Abreu 1998: 92-3; Elshtain 1987; Seifert 1995:58; Cockburn 2001:22; Turshen  
2001b: 12 
38 Enloe 2000:111; Seifert 1995:58; Seifert 1999:150-1; Cockburn 2001:22; Turshen  2001b:59 
39 Goldstein 2001; Human Security Centre 2005; Turshen 2001b:59  
40 Turshen 2001b: 12 
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 assumption. It briefly describes the “rape as a weapon of war” thesis and then adds 
that, “even without official encouragement most wars involve a dramatic erosion in 
the norms that restrain anti-social behaviour in times of peace … there is often little 
to deter individuals from acting out their violent desires” (Human Security Centre 
2005:109, emphasis added).  Although the gender-neutral word, “individual” is used, 
it is clear from the context that the authors consider it inevitable that it is men who will 
have the desire to, and will actually, commit acts of sexual violence against women 
unless they are prevented from doing so. Not an uncommon stance in international 
reports, this also ignores, or at least down-plays, the increase in sexual violence 
against women perpetrated by men on the “same side”. The position also ignores the 
testimonies of men who claim to commit such acts only under duress (Enloe 
2004:117), and does not allow for the variety in men’s attitudes and behaviour.  
 
Such a view of the inevitability of sexual violence is also commonly expressed with 
regard to what happens after wars end, when the social constraints on men’s 
behaviour often remain low, particularly in the absence of effective security sector 
reform, and controls may even be reduced where men are no longer subject even to 
military discipline. Over time this violent situation may come to be seen as normal 
rather than exceptional, with a generalised acceptance of a variety of forms of social 
violence, or a climate of violence developing (Sideris 2001b:142; Turshen 2001b12).  
 
Explanations specifically for the post-war backlash and its violent elements tend to be 
made at a very general level, such as describing it as a “backlash of patriarchy” or re-
assertion of patriarchy, particularly where women had achieved some temporary new 
freedoms during conflict periods.41 Such explanations tend to be based on 
deductions that men are consciously seeking to regain lost power and have a need to 
assert themselves to the point of aggression – often where there is social acceptance 
of violence (Pillay 2001:39; Sideris 2001b:143-4). This approach chimes strongly with 
analyses of the West which consider long-term changes, such as the “crisis of 
masculinity” approach, and are vulnerable to the same criticisms. 
 
Other commentators squarely attribute precisely the same violent behaviour to the 
psychological damage experienced by men (Krog 2001:212; Sideris 2001a:57, 59-
60). In addition to there being a lack of social restraint, and a sense of violence as 
                                                
41 Kandiyoti, this volume; Meintjes et al. 2001; Turshen 2001a; Ibeanu 2001:199-204; Kesby 1996; 
Becker 2001: 225   
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 being “normal”, they also argue that the prior experience of committing sexual 
violence in war, as well as other violent experiences, stays with men and makes 
them more likely to commit post-war violence against women. Increases in post-war 
domestic violence also tend to be considered within this framework. Krog and Sideris 
(Krog 2001:212; Sideris 2001a:57, 59-60) both summarise many women’s 
statements made about their own experiences when they, “reflected on cases of 
male ex-combatants involved in criminal activities, depression in men, increased 
rates of suicide amongst men post-war, and the expression of their anger and 
frustration in the domestic sphere” (Sideris 2001a:52). 
 
Whilst many people take the view that emotional and psychological factors affect 
men’s post-war behaviour (IRIN 2004), it is surprisingly difficult to draw strong 
conclusions from actual research in this area (Jones et al. 2002) and research 
suggests that no society in the world responds adequately to support men thought to 
be suffering in this way (Gabriel et al. 2002). When one considers the findings from 
non-war contexts about the importance of childhood trauma in causing violent 
behaviour later in life, and the high numbers of soldiers in today’s wars who start their 
combat lives as children, the problem seems enormous. Yet the psychological effects 
of war (or childhood poverty, trauma or other experiences) on men do not appear in 
many people’s explanations for why men commit violence against women, or as a 
priority in post-war reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts. In the case of South 
Africa some action research has led to a re-thinking about the nature of post-
traumatic stress disorder and the ways in which it might be treated (Hamber et al. 
2000:35) but these findings have not been widely taken up. 
 
Chodorow, who pioneered the understanding of men’s psychology as being partly a 
function of their parenting, has developed her own work further to consider what it is 
about masculinity that is connected to violence in non-western societies. She locates 
the explanation for aggressive behaviour in psychodynamics, “Can we see cultural 
practices and processes as individuals writ large? Do we want to explain cultural 
violence [rape, killing, torturing] on the basis of collective child-rearing practices or 
infantile experiences of failures in recognition and intersubjectivity?” (Chodorow 
2002:243). She makes the point that the language used in political ideologies that 
promote violent behaviour is similar to that used by psychoanalysts seeking 
explanations for aggression in individuals in their individual experiences: identity; 
badness of the other, humiliation and shame. Other factors she cites as relevant 
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 include: father absence after defeat, hunger and emotionally unavailable mothers, 
and comments:  
Just as analysts find in someone who feels endangered and who has not been 
able previously to develop a reflective self … a flooding fragmentation and 
dissolution of boundaries intertwined with reactive aggression, so the breakdown 
of a totalitarian state, of a state symbolized in one leader … or the sudden 
withdrawal of a colonial power, may lead to a violent lawlessness, ethnic war, and 
brutal ethnic cleansing… (Chodorow 2002:246-7) 
 
and she extends the analysis: 
Many projective ideologies (of nationalism, xenophobia, racial-ethnic hatred, and 
so forth) clearly support the view that identity is a psychosocial as well as an 
individual issue. Nonetheless if we were to analyze those individuals engaged in 
ethnic violence, we might well find that their individual unconscious fantasies 
involved not threats to self-separation, but fears, depressive anxiety, homosexual 
panic, defensive masculinity, identification with a soldier father, manic denial of 
survival, triumphant elation at survival, mourning a loss, or any number of 
fantasies. (Chodorow 2002:249) 
 
This work is clearly an important development in attempting to combine the insights 
from very different analytical approaches, and perhaps points the way to further 
development. For instance Richards’ work (Richards 1995) on Sierra Leonean 
“warboys” highlights child abuse through several generations as a major cause of 
their extremely violent behaviour. In the analysis of some post-conflict settings, the 
psychological dimension does appear, but with reference to the whole community, 
rather than to men in particular. Hamber comments, “In South Africa, the entire 
discourse of nation building was imbued with the pseudo-psychological construction 
on national healing, incorrectly implying that nations have collective psyches. The 
problematic results were that individual needs such as long-term healing and the 
desire for justice were, to a degree, subordinated to the collective drive to 
‘reconcile’”42. 
 
Returning to the social explanations for men’s violence to women, an increasing 
number of writers use the term masculinity to describe patterns of male behaviour, 
and, as in the non-war literature, assume that this changes along with major social 
and political change. Several writers have argued that at times of socio-political 
tension prior to conflict, as well as during conflict itself, some types of masculinity 
come to be celebrated and actively promoted to a greater degree than others (El 
Bushra 2000:76, 80; Cockburn 1998:207, 2001:20). In some conflict situations, the 
more violent aspects of masculinity are played out in all aspects of men’s lives to an 
                                                
42 Hamber 2003:14. Ignatieff 1998 also warns against assuming there is a national psyche in The 
Warrior’s Honour. Arendt’s warnings about conceptualising a ‘sick society’, rather than sick people, are 
also pertinent here; she sees this as being more likely to make people see violence as natural (and 
inevitable) rather than being politicised (Arendt, 1970: 75). 
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 extreme degree, in what Hague calls a “hetero-national masculinity”, with reference 
to the Serb and Bosnian Serb military (Hague 1997:55). Such a rise in nationalist or 
ethnic consciousness does not usually end with a peace agreement and so is still 
also part of the discourse of the aftermath.43  
 
In addition to such changes in masculinity somehow being inevitable with war, some 
writers emphasise that this change is consciously sought and promoted by political 
leaders. Encouraging men to be more aggressive with the rise of nationalist or ethnic 
consciousness is here intended both to gain political support for the cause and to 
undermine “the other”. Egotistical, aggressive, dominant behaviours are common 
features of such cultural definitions of masculinity, as is men’s dominance over 
women (Byrne 1996:33). This manipulation of masculinity is often asserted in the 
literature but is rarely accompanied by analysis of how it happens. Women play key 
roles in affirming and encouraging all aspects of masculinities; as one of the main 
institutions for promoting one or other set of behaviours and values is that of the 
family – where women play a leading role in educating young people and indeed in 
encouraging adults to favour one or other set of attributes. In some cases this leads 
women to put great pressure on male relatives, including sons, to embrace violence, 
to “be brave”, fight, stand up for the honour of your family/ nation etc – in effect “be a 
real man” (Pillay 2001:41; Munn 2005). Some writers are keen to avoid blaming 
women entirely for this phenomenon, stressing that this role has to be weighed 
against the role of other institutions which play key roles here, such as political 
parties, nationalist movements and age groups (El Bushra 2000). The actual 
processes of changing masculinities (as ideologies and discourses) seem to be the 
same as those that take place in non-war communities, but the detail of what we 
understand in non-war settings about individual men’s psychologies, and how they 
will experience such pressures and react differently, has yet to be applied in conflict 
and post-conflict settings. 
 
The type of behaviour such processes encourage or engender are described as 
“hyper-masculinity” by some (Boesten, this volume); aggression and uncontrolled 
virility being key features, but also accompanied by some rejection of modernity 
embodied in a sense of a “return to the warrior” or to the “essence” of a key group. 
Such ideology is also often accompanied with an undermining of women’s rights by 
the state (Turshen 2001a). In contrast to the non-war literature the concept of 
hegemonic masculinity has not appeared so often (although Moser 2001:37 mentions 
                                                
43 Pillay 2001:41; 43; Žarkov et al. this volume; Luciak this volume 
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 it), although it is increasing (for example Enloe 2005). In these uses masculinity is 
explicitly not seen as being in crisis but in the ascendancy and in a primary dominant 
phase. Used in this way the concept does not allow us to see easily or understand 
what happens to individual men (why they change) or the variety of men’s responses. 
Segal (1990:121-2) highlights interesting examples of men who seem to personify a 
particularly violent form of hyper-masculinity, and yet who do not fit the 
corresponding stereotype in all their behaviour. She highlights Nazi camp supervisors 
in Auschwitz, Treblinka and Dachau who were gentle to their wives and a British 
army veteran of the Falklands war who was “completely without bravado”. The 
concepts of masculinity, hyper-masculinity, hegemonic masculinity and crisis of 
masculinity, do not help us with understanding the variety of behaviour patterns. 
 
The expression “crisis of masculinity” is nonetheless sometimes used with regard to 
war-torn societies, but just as with non-war societies is often very ambiguous. The 
aftermath of war is thought to have denied men key roles and identities which socially 
defined manhood in pre-war situations, and the frustration this causes leads them to 
be aggressive to their partners and/or other women (IRIN 2004:7): “Paradoxically 
although war is a male-dominated arena, men’s identity might emerge from conflict 
even more damaged than women’s. Many women gain strength from the experience 
of war … In my view, men feel threatened by this survival and so retreat into trying to 
reassert their manhood in the only area where this seems possible – in intimate 
relationships” (Sideris 2001b:52). It is important to note that this is a diametrically 
opposite argument from that which proposes that men’s strengthened masculinities 
as combatants or as newly-aroused, defenders of national or ethnic identities are at 
the root of such aggression. Clearly there are parallels in Sideris’ description with the 
way in which the “crisis of masculinity” is used in non-war societies that are going 
through major socio-economic change that tends to leave men with reduced security 
of employment, for instance. Once again such approaches do not easily allow for, let 
alone shed light on, the range of men’s experiences and responses which actually 
may be very varied indeed. 
 
In war and post-war contexts we have yet to develop a significant body of research 
about what men themselves say about their situations. One exception is Dolan who 
describes how the effects of conflict-related poverty and economic change have left 
men in Northern Uganda feeling no longer able to “be a man” in the same way as in 
the past. Dolan usefully distinguishes between the lived experience of men, which 
may be highly varied in peace time, but which in war-time often becomes closer to 
being uniform, and the lived expectations of men, that is,  what they hope to be, 
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 which could always be the same (Dolan 2002:77). Such an example may be seen to 
exemplify a situation where a hegemonic masculinity, as a set of idealised identities, 
behaviours and roles, is imagined and aspired to, but which is not achieved by most 
men (although Dolan does not use the term hegemonic). Dolan suggests that men 
commit new forms of violence against women because their masculinity (that is, their 
“proper” role in society) has been thwarted, and men are failing to achieve what they 
want or need to (Dolan 2000:78-9), ie. that which others might describe as the ideals 
of a hegemonic masculinity. This argument is also rooted in the socio-political 
frustration-aggression explanations for violence, as well as the “culture of violence” 
thesis, but does not explore the psychological dimensions which might explain the 
variety of responses from men to these pressures. Furthermore, in the post-conflict 
literature, the connection between the frustration-aggression ‘explanation’ for 
violence against women, and a hard-to-achieve set of roles is not couched in terms 
of a failure of most to achieve the ideals of a hegemonic masculinity. 
 
A completely contrasting approach which takes on board the contingency of material 
context is put forward by Turshen (2001b:55, 60). Rather than being related to any 
psychological predisposition she argues that, in Africa at least, a key motivation for 
men to commit violence, particularly sexual violence, against women is direct 
personal material gain, suggesting that “Systematic rape and sexual abuse are 
among the strategies men use to wrest personal assets from women” (Turshen 
2001b:55). Such material gain may include women’s labour44; or land (Turshen 
2001b:62-3) or other property (Turshen and Twagiramariya 1998:109) where women 
feel they have no choice but to give men whatever they request when faced with rape 
and other forms of assault and threat of further violence. She suggests that this 
motivation might be restricted to societies where gender relations are so unequal that 
women are not legally autonomous individuals (that is, where colonial and customary 
legal codes have combined) (Turshen 2001b:65). Perhaps an additional context is one 
of poverty, where access to very small amounts of property has great significance. 
Turshen gives us a careful analysis of the outcome of such violence in two African 
cases, but we do not have much information about men’s motives, and are left to 
deduce this. It is worth noting that explanations offered for rape in other places, for 
example former Yugoslavia (Cockburn 1998:207), do not mention gaining access to 
property or labour as motives.  
 
Finally, as we have seen, an element of explanation for the prevalence and 
persistence of domestic violence in non-war settings is the inability of women to get 
                                                
44 Pillay 2001:38; Turshen 2001b:61; De Abreu 2001: 92-4 
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 away from violent men; a key constraint being access to resources; both financial, 
where they have few opportunities to earn independent income, but also social 
resources, in societies where there is a strong stigma about divorce and/or shortage 
of men, or issues of custody of children. All of these issues are also key in many 
post-war societies. Many women want to stay with their partners in spite of such 
violence because of the desire to get back to a previous situation where marriage 
and the family were important sites of affirmation, identity and economic resources 
(Turshen 2001b:80-1; El Bushra 2000:83). Staying with violent men does however, 
increase the overall chances of violence occurring again. 
 
Conclusion 
Current descriptions and analyses of men’s violent behaviour towards women in war 
and post-war settings offer a variety of different approaches which have contrasting 
meanings. The issue of men’s agency or responsibility is a theme that runs very 
unevenly through these accounts, with those at one extreme regarding such violence 
as cross-culturally uniform and inevitable, whether primarily from bio-social or socio-
political phenomena, and at the other extreme holding men individually responsible 
for their bullying, deliberate claiming of social, political and economic advantage 
through the use of force against women. Furthermore there is an in-built confusion 
underlying many common analyses in the insistence that there is something distinct 
about war situations that makes men more likely to behave like this, even in the 
aftermath, but with little investigation into how precisely warfare impacts on men’s 
thoughts, feelings, indeed psychology, which has this effect, and a marginalization of 
the findings from studies of men’s violence against women in non-war settings. 
 
Evidence from research in non-war settings suggests that men’s violent behaviour 
towards women – known and otherwise – does seem to have some connection to 
early life experiences, as well as to witnessing, experiencing and committing other 
acts of violence. Hence perhaps it is not just the fact of war that causes men to 
behave in this way. This analysis does not lead to very optimistic or feasible 
strategies for future change. On the positive side, it does reinforce the view that such 
behaviour is not in any simple way biologically determined, and therefore the 
“constraints removed” thesis is less compelling, if one considers it to be founded on a 
biological or bio-social argument. Furthermore the fact that not all men behave in the 
same way, even when they have been through similar experiences, brings further 
into doubt that the correlation between participation in war, and violence against 
women signifies a simple causal relationship. We need to understand more about the 
men who do not resort to violence even when they have all the life experiences that 
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 would lead us to expect them to. Many countries have seen the development of 
groups that involve men in working against men’s violence against women45, but they 
remain small-scale and are not generally given the mainstream support of 
governments or international organisations, and the lessons they reveal are not 
widely shared. A further, challenging example is offered by Pearce (2006) of El 
Salvadorian men changing their behaviour, once the guerrilla movement required 
them not to be violent to each other or to women. 
 
Masculinity is a term in frequent use in the post-war literature and, along with its 
various refinements, is frequently brought into discussions of men’s violences. There 
is astonishing slippage in much of this writing, however, between abstract and 
concrete levels of analysis, and therefore confusion about what precisely is being 
discussed. There is therefore a need for caution in using the terms “masculinity”, 
“hegemonic masculinity/ies”, and “hetero-masculinity” in seeking explanations for 
post-conflict violence of men against women. Greater specificity about the focus of 
analysis would develop the analysis of these contexts further. We tend not to use the 
term femininity when we analyse the situations of women, but are more precise about 
whether our focus is on women’s various and contrasting social roles, identities, 
sources of and constraints on power and control, access to and use of own labour, 
for example, and how these change over time and are challenged, so our analyses of 
men surely deserves the same level of precision. Such a body of work in the study of 
men is still in development, I suggest, and its absence or weakness is sometimes 
masked by the use of the clumsy term masculinity. 
 
Types of men’s identity and behaviour are highly varied across space; not all wars 
are followed by the same type of backlash, and indeed not all wars see the same 
degree of sexual violence. We still understand little about which factors increase or 
decrease the likeliness of such behaviour becoming a deliberate, conscious part of a 
political-military project during war – the “rape as a weapon of war” thesis. The 
explanations for change in masculinities in non-war situations still remain obscure, as 
they do in post-war contexts, although we have a better understanding of how this 
happens in the former. Analysts have tended to take a functionalist view in seeing 
that a change might be in the “interests of patriarchy” and therefore concluding that 
this must be the explanation for change, with no explanation offered at all for the 
variety of men’s behaviours and little sense of the potential agency of men.  
 
                                                
45 Boesten, this volume; Sideris 2001b:155; De Abreu 1998:81-2. 
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 The predominantly unclear analysis and confused, over-generalised explanations for 
the behaviours of men in the post-war literature do not help us much in 
understanding the key processes at work, let alone in identifying strategies for 
reducing violence against women. In the context of such intense gender politics in 
war-torn societies the persistent reluctance of many analysts and advisers to take on 
lessons about gendering analysis and policy processes46 has not been effectively 
challenged by our relatively weak analyses of men. If future research were to focus on 
a) the psychologies of violence and b) the lived experience of men who are not 
violent, we might begin to identify where and how societies may recover better, and 
how more women may have greater freedoms to seek justice and reconciliation on 
their own terms, freer from the fear of violence. 
                                                
46 A male reader for a recent piece of commissioned writing on this subject initially rejected a section of 
my draft about sexual violence and the backlash, not on the basis of insufficient evidence, but a belief 
that the account was ‘too negative’ and ‘exaggerated’. 
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